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Explaining what made ancient Greek law unusual, Michael Gagarin observes 
that most premodern legal cultures “wrote extensive sets (or codes) of laws for 
academic purposes or propaganda but these were not intended to be accessible 
to most members of the community and had relatively little effect on the actual 
operation of the legal system.” This article addresses the implications of writing 
for customary or regional law in South and Southeast Asia. The textual tradition 
of Dharmaśāstra (“Hindu law”), which canonizes a particular model of Brahmin 
customary norms, can certainly be called a “scholarly” exercise, and it was also 
intended as propaganda for the Brahmanical cosmopolitan world order. But it also 
formulated a procedural principle to recognize the general validity of other, even 
divergent, customary norms, though for the most part such rules remained lex 
non scripta. On the other hand, inscriptions provide evidence that writing was 
used for diverse legal purposes and offers glimpses of actual legal practice. In 
these records, customary laws are sometimes laid down as statutes by decree of 
a ruler or community body, or are simply invoked as long-established customary 
rules. But even when Dharmaśāstra texts are not directly cited, their influence over 
the longue durée is discernable in the persistence of śāstric legal categories and 
terms of art. This influence is even more evident in Java, where legal codes on 
the Dharmaśāstra model were composed in Javanese, and where the inscriptions 
came to exhibit a closer connection with śāstric discourse than is found in India.
introduction
Modern lawyers sometimes have trouble seeing custom or “folk law” as law at all, at least 
in a formal sense. The ninteenth-century legal theorist John Austin’s classical formula held 
that law consists of the commands of a sovereign backed by the threat of sanctions. Custom 
in itself is mere habit until it is gets adopted by judges (and thus tacitly by the sovereign). 1
More recent positive law theorists have tended to insist that in the absence of a constitu-
tion, a legislative apparatus, and a bureaucratic state able to provide for enforcement, there 
can be no legal rules per se, only maxims or customs. To have law, said the positivists, there 
must be a “basic norm” (Grundnorm: Kelsen 1949) or a “rule of recognition” (Hart 1994 
[1961]), that is, a rule with broad acceptance in accordance with which all other laws derive 
This article began as a lecture at the University of Virginia, 24 February 2011. The research was largely conducted 
under the auspices of the Institut français de Pondichéry during 2009–10, with the support of a Fulbright-Hays FRA 
fellowship. Revisions were made during the following year with a sabbatical fellowship from the American Philo-
sophical Society and from a Lenfest Sabbatical Fellowship (Washington and Lee University). I am grateful to these 
institutions for their support. I have benefited from comments by Patrick Olivelle, David Brick, Arlo Griffiths, and 
anonymous readers for the Journal.
1. Austin 1995 (1832): 34–36, 141–42, 238–39.
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their validity. 2 Custom, ostensibly based on common acceptance alone, Hart considered insuf-
ficient to serve legal functions.
In the last half-century, the legal positivist model has been attacked from various sides, 
largely by puncturing the grand Austinian notion that everything in law hangs on the rules. 
Ronald Dworkin, arch-nemesis of the positivists, faulted them for ignoring (or waffling on) 
the legal uses of principles (i.e., moral propositions invoked to influence legal argument), 
and more fundamentally for asserting that a value-neutral definition of legal validity is an 
adequate theory of law. Legal realism directed our attention away from rules altogether and 
toward the (often informal) ways in which legal work actually gets done. 3 And the anthropol-
ogy of law has insisted that societies without state-based law, constitution, or written statutes 
are not on that account devoid of law.
Legal pluralism, one of the chief outgrowths of the anthropology of law, began by empha-
sizing another situation of recognition: the recognition of customary law by the “centralist” 
law of the state, especially the colonial state and post-independence successor states. 4 More 
broadly, legal pluralists seek to show how “the law” can never be a single, hermetic, state-
driven machine, but is always a fluid, complex web of interconnected sets of standards—plu-
ralism in the “strong sense.” In most nation-states today, the “official” law claims ultimacy, 
selectively recognizing the rules of other social associations—corporate regulations, profes-
sional guidelines, industrial standards, etc. 5 The recognition of law in pluralistic settings is 
of course just a subset of Hart’s recognition, lower links in the chain of validity.
In British India, for example, colonial lawyers developed ways to recognize laws based 
on indigenous custom. Although they had begun, in the late eighteenth century, to look for 
“black letter law” in the “Shasters” (Dharmaśāstras)—by consulting Brahmin pundits, and 
then by translating the “Laws of Manu” into English—they soon enough came to realize 
that this was not the basis of the law as most Indians knew it. 6 Rather, as the French priest 
Bouchet recognized in 1714, it was oral and customary, but not for that reason indeterminate. 7 
The British courts thus sought to draw on it through the testimony of native informants; then, 
importing the principle of precedent, a written version (albeit an often quite distorted one) 
emerged through accretion in the form of “judge-made law,” which in the view of British 
jurists had the benefit over customary legal practice in that it could be clearly fixed and thus 
consistently applied.
But was pre-British (and non-Mughal) Indian law wholly unwritten? And did it lack a 
rule of recognition? We do not need to reconcile or decide between theoretical approaches 
2. These two concepts differ mainly in intellectual rationale: Kelsen’s “Grundnorm” is a neo-Kantian ideal 
deduced (without recourse to social facts) from the legalistic treatment of certain norms, while Hart’s “rule of rec-
ognition” purports to be derived from observation of how legal professionals look to a source or “pedigree” for a 
law’s validity (Bix 2005: 35–36).
3. Davis (2006) argues that in spite of a natural-law veneer in the form of Dharmaśāstra’s putative derivation 
from a transcendent source (the Veda or śruti), Hindu law in practice, and even to some extent in theory, is defined 
by its “social working.”
4. This is John Griffiths’ (1986: 6 and passim) “pluralism in the weak sense.” For a recent example, see South 
Africa’s Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. He spoke of “legal centralism” as the ideology that 
only the official law of a nation-state counts as law, an idea which he dismissed as a “myth” and an “illusion” (pp. 
4–5). I prefer to use the term “centralism” descriptively to characterize a legal system that claims ultimate authority 
and may choose to recognize as law select elements of “subordinate” or “secondary” legal or quasi-legal systems. 
Centralist state law in fact “is often a secondary rather than a primary locus of regulation” (Galanter 1981: 20).
5. These are the standards of what Moore (1973) called “semi-autonomous social fields”; see also John Griffiths 
2003.
6. Rosane Rocher has lately provided a cogent account of the steps in this process (R. Rocher 2010).
7. Lariviere 1984 translates and discusses Bouchet’s letter.
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to admit that even in a largely customary legal culture “rules is rules”: written rules may 
be accorded a special value that makes them notably different from other legal standards, 
in coercive force, in jurisdiction, or simply in relative weight. Given a system with some 
sort of means of recognition, many sorts of standards—moral or ritual precepts, maxims, 
customary norms, and principles—can be formally recognized as law, and so put to uses 
such as endowing with rights, imposing an obligation, facilitating litigation, or justifying 
state violence.
rules in indic law
We should consider whether premodern Indian society had law in Hart’s sense (or in Ron-
ald Dworkin’s, which acknowledges the legal applications not only of rules but of principles 
and policies), 8 and if so, what mechanisms we can discern for the recognition of customary 
norms and other standards as law. Was there a difference in theory or in practice between 
different sorts of standards? And what effects did writing have on the process? If one impor-
tant effect was to formalize a rule, to clarify its jurisdiction, or to spell out its consequences, 
does it make sense to regard this as a mode of recognition? What can the premodern Indic 
evidence contribute to comparative discussion of recognition of laws?
writing
Explaining what made ancient Greek law unusual, Michael Gagarin observes that most 
other premodern legal cultures “wrote extensive sets (or codes) of laws for academic pur-
poses or propaganda but these were not intended to be accessible to most members of 
the community and had relatively little effect on the actual operation of the legal system” 
(2008: 1). This characterization applies well to Dharmaśāstra, generally speaking, but not to 
all legal uses of writing in India. Dharmaśāstra certainly can be regarded as a “scholarly” 
exercise—“Hindu jurisprudence” 9—and it was intended as propaganda for the Brahmanical 
cosmopolitan world order.
But writing also served other functions in India. An enormous number of inscriptions 
on stone and copper plates have survived, and these presuppose and sometimes explicitly 
attest to the use of palm leaves and other perishable materials for the purpose of framing and 
transmitting such documents. These documents, commonly called lekha (‘writing, writ’) or 
pattra (‘leaf’), are used to record decrees (most commonly to confer land rights and other 
benefices), settlements in a public or private dispute, or charters of customary rules. Dona-
tive decrees and settlements doubled as deed or title to property rights and privileges, and 
there are a number of instances in which the record refers to its own capacity to forestall or 
resolve future disputes over such rights. The use of inscriptions to promulgate statutes of 
general application is rare in India, but not unheard of. The durability of the written docu-
ment is paramount. Records often close with a formula invoking their validity in perpetuity, 
“as long as the moon and sun endure,” and warning future rulers not to violate their terms.
In Southeast Asia, from Burma to Borneo, the importation and appropriation of Indian 
cultural habits and institutions, including legal ones, took the form both of inscriptions (ini-
tially in Sanskrit, but then bilingual and in local languages), and of law-codes superficially 
8. Dworkin 1978: 22–45.
9. Davis’s expression (e.g., 2005 and 2006 passim).
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modeled on Dharmaśāstras but mostly local in language and content. 10 This development is 
particularly instructive in its contrast with the closest analogy in India, where the regional 
Dharmaśāstras, few as they were, were composed in Sanskrit (e.g., the Laghudharmaprakāśikā 
or Śāṃkarasmṛti, from Kerala).
In all these spheres, there are signs that the interplay between Dharma texts and inscrip-
tions fostered the emergence of formal legal institutions that were tied simultaneously to 
local social bodies and state structures, and to an overarching, transregional conception of 
legitimate authority. What is most likely to be left out of account are unwritten norms—rules 
that, to proponents of legal realism and legal pluralism, have legal functions even though 
they are not part of a formal code. We will see some of these as they show up in inscriptions.
In what follows, we will briefly consider what the early Dharmaśāstra had to say about 
regional and parochial norms, before turning to the epigraphy to illustrate the range of legal 
functions that writing could serve in practice. Our examples come from a wide range of times 
and places. There is room here for only the barest sketch of the historical context; in any 
case, for some types of records the numbers are too few to permit a highly nuanced view of 
local distinctions. At the same time, the basic legal functions of inscriptions (and their palm-
leaf or paper analogues) seem to have remained fairly stable over time and space for over a 
millennium at least. Indeed, it has been shown that in South India, the source of the largest 
number of inscriptions, even palm-leaf legal documents produced in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury “are written in a documentary language which has been in vogue since medieval times”; 
indeed, “they resemble very closely medieval inscriptions in style, format and contents and 
so they indirectly help in a better understanding of the inscriptions.” 11
dharmaśāstra
Dharmaśāstra (“Hindu law”) canonizes a particular model of Brahmin customary standards 
(ācāra)—those practiced in the “Land of the Āryas” (Āryāvarta) 12—and it does so in a mixture 
of edifying maxims and substantive apodictic rules on specific points. It is likely that many of 
these were considered normative within particular Brahmin circles at particular times, though 
we cannot now know where or when exactly. 13 Futhermore, the śāstra-authors took it as part of 
their task to compile traditional precepts, but not always to reconcile them when they diverge. 
The result is in some sense a code—a systematic arrangement—but one ill-suited to direct 
application as a code of statutes in a court of law (as the British would learn).
Dharmaśāstra also contains numerous procedural rules, including some that could be 
called rules of recognition, at least within a Brahmin milieu. The most basic of these, found 
10. E.g., the Javanese Adhigama, Pūrvādhigama, Devāgama, and Kuṭāra-Mānava, the Burmese dhammasat-
thas or dhammathats, and the Thai thammasats.
11. Subbarayalu (1991: xiii) made this observation in publishing a collection from one family in the Tiruchira-
palli District. These records, consisting of inscribed palm leaves bearing the legal fee stamps typical of the colonial 
legal system, do indeed often mimic the structure and idioms of the inscriptions. Besides Subbarayalu’s unique 
volume, Zoë Headley and S. Ponnarasu, likewise under the auspices of the Institut français de Pondichéry and with 
funding from the British Library, are coordinating a project to rescue and digitize 40,000 legal documents of the 
Tamil region, ca. 1650–1950. This archive will provide a much wider base for a study of indigenous legal writing 
in the early modern and colonial eras.
12. “The region to the east of where the Sarasvatī (River) disappears, west of Kālaka forest, south of the Hima-
layas, and north of Pāriyātra mountains is the land of the Āryas. The practices of that land alone are authoritative” 
(prāg ādarśāt pratyak kālakavanād dakṣiṇena himavantam udak pāriyātram etad āryāvartam | tasmin ya ācāraḥ sa 
pramāṇam | Baudhāyana-Dharmasūtra (BDhS) 1.2.9, Olivelle 2000: 198–99).
13. Ludo Rocher (1993: 267) suggests that rules in Dharmaśāstra “were, indeed, at some time and in some place 
‘governing the life and conduct of people.’”
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in several forms, seek to establish what counts as dharma. For example, the Āpastamba-
Dharmasūtra (ĀpDhS) begins:
athāto sāmayācārikān dharmān vyākhyāsyāmaḥ | dharmajñasamayaḥ pramāṇam | vedāś ca | 
ĀpDhS 1.1.1–3
1.1.1. Now we shall explain the laws consisting in agreed-upon practice. 2. The consensus of 
dharma-knowers is the standard. 3. And the Vedas.
Elsewhere in that work, a pair of maxims reinforces the predominance of collective human 
authority over any transcendent source of dharma:
na dharmādharmau carata āvaṃ sva iti | na devagandharvā na pitara ity ācakṣate ’yaṃ dharmo 
’yam adharma iti | yat tv āryāḥ kriyamāṇaṃ praśaṃsanti sa dharmo yad garhante so ’dharmaḥ | 
ĀpDhS 1.20.6–7
1.20.6. Dharma and adharma do not go around saying, “Here we are!” Nor do gods, Gandharvas 
[angels], or ancestors declare, “This is dharma and that is adharma.” 7. An activity that Āryas 
praise is dharma, and what they deplore is adharma. 14
Although the Āpastamba here seems to relegate Veda to secondary status, the general view 
stipulates that ācāra is valid only to the extent that it does not contravene scripture. Scripture 
is even invoked on a few occasions to justify one rule over another, for example, to sup-
port the paternity claim of a biological father over his child in an adulterous union (ĀpDhS 
2.13.5–6; cf. BDhS 2.3.34; VDhS 17.9).
On the other hand, the very next sentences warn readers that some of the conduct depicted 
in scripture is not legitimate in the present day, since the ancients had “extraordinary power” 
that people lack in later ages (2.13.7–9). The sūtra goes on to consider several practices 
attributed to “some” or to “some regions”: the giving away or formal sale of children, primo-
genitary inheritance, and other unequal divisions of an estate (2.13.10–2.15.1). These prac-
tices are declared invalid on the basis of textual authority: “That is forbidden by the śāstras” 
(tac chāstrair vipratiṣiddham). After some further examples of good customary practices, the 
discussion closes: “By this, the rules followed in regions and families are explained” (etena 
deśakuladharmā vyākhyātāḥ).
Gautama-Dharmasūtra 11.19–22, after listing the textual sources of Dharma, specifies 
that “the dharmas of regions, castes, and families are also authoritative if they are not in 
conflict with the sacred scriptures. Farmers, merchants, herdsmen, moneylenders, and arti-
sans exercise authority over their respective groups. [The king] should dispense Dharma 
after he has ascertained the facts from authoritative persons of each group.” 15 Baudhāyana-
Dharmasūtra (1.2.1–9) goes so far as to recognize specific deviant regional norms, though it 
admits that Gautama accepts only those practices found in Āryāvarta.
Vasiṣṭha-Dharmasūtra, the latest of the sūtras (1st c. b.c.e.), expresses what becomes the 
consensus view (1.17): “Where Vedic warrant is lacking, Manu has endorsed the dharmas of 
one’s region, caste, or family” (deśadharma-jātidharma-kuladharmāñ śrutyabhāvād abravīn 
manuḥ). Compare this with a provision of the South African Constitution of 1998: “§211(3). 
The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution 
14. Adapting Olivelle’s translation (2000: 56–57). A stanza quoted in Vāsiṣṭha-Dharmasūtra (VDhS) 1.16 
states directly what is implicit here—the traits that qualify someone to declare what is or is not Dharma: “Whatever 
men eminent in the three-fold Veda and learned in dharma call dharma, that is dharma, [capable] of purifying one-
self and others” (traividya vṛddhā yam brūyur dharmaṃ dharmavido janāḥ | pavane pāvane caiva sa dharmo nātra 
saṃśayaḥ || iti) (my translation).
15. deśajātikuladharmāś cāmnāyair aviruddhāḥ pramāṇam | karṣakavaṇikpaśupālakusīdikāravaḥ sve sve 
varge | tebhyo yathādhikāram arthān pratyavahṛtya dharmavyavasthā |.
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and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.” This section recognizes per-
tinent customary law so long as such law does not violate the Constitution and other relevant 
constitutionally valid laws (the proviso in this case being to ensure that no customary law 
be recognized that violates the constitutional principle of equality before the law). In both of 
these examples, customary rules are allowed to supplement or extend the centralist law so 
long as they are not allowed to supersede it.
Hart argued that such norms cannot by definition rise to the status of “laws” until some 
procedural rule is established to define what counts as law. For the most part, he regards cus-
tomary rules as too informal to count as laws. Apart from the few examples like those cited 
above, classical Dharmaśāstras rarely commited local norms to writing. The passages cited 
above, though, do provide explicit procedural rules for determining the status of customary 
norms as valid Dharma: the customary practice (ācāra) of well-trained Āryas within the 
boundaries of Āryāvarta is deemed a valid supplement to textual sources (and in fact pro-
vided the basis of Smṛti texts [Śāstra] in the first place); local norms (deśadharmas, kulācāra, 
etc.) are also valid, at least so long as they do not conflict with Veda or Śāstra—and some 
(e.g., the Baudhāyanas) were inclined to allow them even when they did conflict.
In the modern world, norms generally are accorded legal force only when reduced to writ-
ing. On the face of it, in India we seem to find the reverse situation. Unwritten rules appear 
usually to have been the only ones accepted in court hearings. Davis (2010: 13–15) describes 
Dharmaśāstra as a form of jurisprudence, designed for establishing legal principles and train-
ing legal minds. This characterization suits perfectly the later products of the tradition: the 
commentaries and topically arranged compendia of the medieval age. The versified codes 
transmitted under the names of Manu, Yājñavalkya, Nārada, Bṛhaspati, and others, however, 
though they surely served such purposes as well (Gagarin’s “propaganda”), outwardly take 
the form of rules: part constitution, part procedural law, part substantive laws, often quite 
detailed, defining crimes and torts, prescribing courtroom process, and proposing penalties 
and other remedies. They have their roots in older rulebooks, the codes that spell out the 
standard forms of Vedic ritual practice. The dispute over whether they contain laws or not 
pivots not so much on how they are framed as on the absence of direct evidence that they 
were applied in legal practice.
But direct evidence for everyday life in premodern India is patchy in the extreme: plenti-
ful in a few areas of life and sparse in many more, leaving vast swaths in total, cavernous 
obscurity. In what follows, I will shine the lantern on a few inscriptions, twinkling nuggets of 
legal practice that lie exposed to view in the bedrock of the epigraphic record. Although the 
evidence is scattered, it will be sufficient to show that writing in classical and medieval India 
served a wide range of legal purposes, well beyond those of the Dharmaśāstra.
legislation
Now let us say for the moment that Gagarin is right that the Greeks’ peculiarity is that they 
used writing to legislate and to publicize laws, and let us acknowledge the usual view that Indians 
(like many other premodern peoples) did not do so, but rather used writing only for propaganda, 
scholarship, and documentation. How then should we account for the existence of inscriptions 
that either record or invoke explicit rules that seem to have the character of fixed laws?
The “Charter of Viṣṇuṣeṇa”
As in many other ancient societies, the royal decree seems to serve as a basic mechanism 
of formal legislation, at least where its purpose is to institute or endorse a rule or set of rules 
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to govern conduct on a regular basis. Examples of this are rare, especially in the early epig-
raphy, but they are not altogether absent. The most famous example is known as the “Charter 
of Viṣṇuṣeṇa” (592 c.e.), 16 a list of over seventy rules based on the customary rules (ācāra) 
of a merchant-community (vāṇig-grāma), by whom a Maitraka-era ruler had been petitioned 
(vijñapta) to document and publish them in writing in a “charter of statutes” (sthiti-pātra). 17 
The notion that a king should have a record of his subjects’ customary laws in writing is 
well established in śāstra. The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra (KAŚ 2.7.2) explicitly prescribes that 
the Bureau of Official Records (nibandha-pustaka-sthāna) should keep a record of the “laws, 
conventions, customs, and canons with respect to regions, villages, castes, families, and 
associations” (deśa-grāma-jāti-kula-saṅghānāṃ dharma-vyavahāra-caritra-saṁsthānam). 18
The Maitraka dynasty, founded in Saurashtra in western India by a regional vassal of the 
imperial Guptas, reigned from Valabhi from the late fifth century through the middle of the 
eighth. Viṣṇuṣeṇa, a contemporary of the Maitraka ruler Dharasena II, issued the charter in 
his authority as mahāsāmanta, a title which during the sixth century in this region came to 
be adopted by feudatories; in this charter, it is included along with four other titles, together 
constituting the ‘five titles’ (pañca-mahāśabda), first used by Dhruvasena I (525–45) in 
deference to the Gupta emperor. 19 By the middle of the century, the Maitrakas had ceased 
to pay allegiance to the Guptas, 20 and their own governors in turn began to style themselves 
mahāsāmanta; such seems to be the case of Viṣṇuṣeṇa.
Viṣṇuṣeṇa’s charter is an unusual record, and given how little we know from other sources 
about its social and political context, much of the technical terminology it uses—official 
titles, legal categories, names of particular taxes and fees—remains rather opaque. Never-
theless, it is possible to recognize that these statutes are broadly intended to set certain limits 
on how the state and its representatives may impose on its subjects, and on the merchants in 
particular, but the statutes also regulate civil harms, trade practices, and legal process, and 
set fees and fines of many sorts. Here I offer the first complete translation of the inscription. 21 
(Given our lack of knowledge about the context and particular usage of the terms of art 
employed, the precise force of many of these rules cannot be explained. Where an asterisk 
precedes a rule, the rendering should be considered particularly tentative and uncertain.)
16. In interpreting this document, I have considered the discussions of Sircar 1958 and 1984, Kosambi 1959, 
Gopal 1963, Sohoni 1987, Virkus 2004, and Ray 2004.
17. Naturally, the translation of technical terms like pātra (= pattra) and sthiti can only be approximate. Pattra 
(lit., ‘leaf’) is, however, always a physical document, whether written on a leaf, a sheet of copper, or stone. The 
term sthiti, which like ‘statute’ is derived from the verb ‘to stand’, definitely denotes a rule clearly formulated by 
an authoritative person or body, as opposed to a customary standard or norm expressed less formally. In India, as 
elsewhere, these categories have probably never been not altogether distinct.
18. Translation after Olivelle 2013: 111. In a personal communication, Olivelle notes an illustrative example 
described by Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa in which an Ābhīra tribesman admits all the evidence presented that he has committed 
adultery but claims innocence on the grounds of tribal custom, recorded in the king’s books, which overrides other 
legal considerations (Smṛticandrikā, vol. 3.1, p. 24).
19. On the meaning of sāmanta and of the title mahāsāmanta ‘subordinate neighboring king’: Gopal 1963; 
on the pañcamahāśabdas (mahākārttākṛtika-mahādaṇḍanāyaka-mahāpratīhāra-mahāsāmanta-mahārāja): Sircar 
1958: 167; 1966: 175, 177.
20. Gopal 1963: 26 n. 2, citing the the Wala copperplate grant of 588 as evidence.
21. I have benefited much from comments and suggestions from Patrick Olivelle, Oskar von Hinüber, and Mark 
McClish. Harald Wiese generously shared with me a draft of the translation and analysis that he and Sadananda 
Das are in the course of preparing. They have sought to rethink some of the knottiest passages in wholly new ways, 
based in part on their analysis of the structure of the charter, and when their work is complete it may throw new 
light on some of these.
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[lines 1–4] svasti lohāṭāvāsakāt paramabhaṭṭārakaśrībāvapādānudhyāto mahākārttākṛti ka-
mahādaṇḍanāyaka-mahāpratīhāra-mahāsāmanta-mahārāja-śrī-Viṣṇuṣeṇaḥ [ku]śalī 
[sa]rvvān eva svān rāja-rājaputra-rājasthānīyāyuktaka-viniyuktaka-śaulkika-coroddharaṇika-
vailabdhika-cāṭa-bhaṭādīn anyāṃś ca yathāsaṃbadhyamānakān ādeśavikṣepakāriṇa[ḥ] 
dhruvādhikaraṇaṃ ca samājñāpayaty . astu vaḥ saṃviditaṃ yathā vijñāpto haṃ vaṇig-grāmeṇa 
yathāsmākaṃ lokasaṃgrahānugrahārtham ācārasthitipātram ātmīyaṃ prasādīkurvvantu. 
tan mayā bhūtapūrvvasya janapadasyābhūtapūrvvasya ca parirakṣaṇasanniveśanāyātmīyaṃ 
sthitipātraṃ prasādīkṛtaṃ 
Prosperity! From the Lohāṭā-residence, the supreme majesty, who meditates on the feet of his 
father, the great overseer, great bearer of the rod of justice, great chamberlain, great feudatory, 
great king, his highness Viṣṇuṣeṇa, being in good health, commands all his kings, princes, pal-
ace officials, outpost officials, tax officers, thief-apprehenders, vailabdhikas, and police and mili-
tary personnel (cāṭa-bhaṭa), and others responsible for executing orders or dispatching agents 
as far as they may be concerned in this, 22 and the Central Court of Justice: 23 Let it be known 
to you that I have been petitioned by the merchant-group thus: for the unity and welfare of our 
people, may [your highness] 24 graciously issue your own charter of customary statutes. So I 
have graciously issued my own charter of statutes in order to protect and settle the countryside, 
both the previously established [areas] and those which are not.
 [Basic property rights]
[sthiti 1] āputrakaṃ na grāhyam |
The property of a man with no son may not be seized [by escheat]. 25
[sthiti 2] unmarabhedo na karaṇīyo rājapuruṣena |
The king’s officer should not ‘violate the threshold’ [i.e., forcibly enter a home]. 26
 [Protections against wrongful prosecution]
[sthiti 3] udbhāvakavyavahāro na grāhyaḥ |
A contrived (udbhāvaka) suit should not be entertained.
[sthiti 4] śaṅkayā grahaṇam nāsti |
Arrest on suspicion is not to be made.
[sthiti 5] puruṣāparādhe strī na grāhyā |
A woman should not be arrested for the crime of her husband.
[sthiti 6] kṣemāgnisamutthāne chalo na grāhyaḥ |
In the event that a safely laid fire spreads, no frivolous complaint shall be entertained.
[sthiti 7] svayaṃhrasite karṇṇe chalo na grāhyaḥ |
In the event of a “self-shortened ear,” no frivolous complaint shall be entertained. 27
[sthiti 8] artthipratyartthinā vinā vyavahāro na grāhyaḥ |
No suit is to be entertained where a plaintiff or a defendant is absent.
22. Njammasch 1997 presents a partial treatment of official titles and address formulas in Maitṛka records.
23. Or “tariff-collection office,” if dhruva- here is short for dhruvasthāna, explained by Sircar as “a station for 
the collection of the king’s fixed grain share” (1966: 96).
24. The royal third person plural is used.
25. The numbering of the rules (as in Sircar) and most of the rule-final daṇḍas have been supplied here.
26. Kauṭilya uses a participle derived from verbal root (bhid-) underlying bheda in a more general prohibition 
against “someone breaking into a sealed house” (samudraṃ gṛham udbhindataḥ). For unmara, cf. Pali ummāra  
‘threshold’ (Cone 2001: 506).
27. This seems to mean a self-inflicted injury for the sake of falsely incriminating another (cf. sthiti 37); this 
may have been an idiom to designate to all such feigned injuries.
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[sthiti 9] āpaṇe āsanasthasya chalo na grāhyaḥ |
A frivolous complaint shall not be entertained from someone who is seated in the market.
 [Fees and other obligations]
[sthiti 10] gośakaṭaṃ na grāhyaṃ |
An oxcart may not be seized.
[sthiti 11]  sāmantāmātyadūtānām anyeṣāṃ cābhyupāgame śayanīyāsanasiddhānnaṃ na dāpayet |
One may not require anyone to provide bed, seat, or prepared food when royal vassals, ministers, 
envoys, or others come through.
[sthiti 12] sarvvaśreṇīnām ekāpaṇako na deyaḥ |
[The fee for] a single shop is not to be paid to all guilds. 28
[sthiti 13] sarvvaśreṇībhiḥ khovādānaṃ na dātavyaṃ |
All guilds are exempt from paying the khovā-fee.
[sthiti 14] rājakule ’dhikaraṇasya ca rājārgghikā deyā | anyeṣām adeyā |
The “king’s perquisite” is to be presented in the royal court or to the [appropriate] department; 
it is to be given to no one else.
[sthiti 15] vārikasya haste nyāsako na sthāpanīyaḥ |
A nyāsaka (‘deposit’?) is not to be placed in the hands of a manager. 29
[sthiti 16] paraviṣayāt kāraṇābhyāgato vāṇijakaḥ parareṣe na grāhyaḥ |
A merchant come on some business from another district may not be detained in someone else’s 
case.
[sthiti 17] āvedanakena vinā utkṛṣṭī na grāhyā |
A general outcry should not be accepted in the absence of a formal complaint.
[sthiti 18] vākpāruṣyadaṇḍapāruṣyayoḥ sākṣitve sārī na grāhyā |
A sārī 30 may not be accepted as witness in a case of verbal or physical assault.
[sthiti 19] ḍheṅkukaḍḍhakanīlaḍumphakāś ca viṣṭiṃ na kārayitavyāḥ |
Ḍheṅkukaḍḍhakas and indigo-makers may not be compelled to perform corvée.
 [Protections against arbitrary or unreasonable detention]
[sthiti 20] prapāpū[ra]kagopālāḥ rājagraheṇa na grāhyā[ḥ*] |
Water-carriers and herdsmen are not to be detained by the royal agent. 31
28. I understand this to be a rule protecting a shop-keeper from having to pay fees to multiple guilds.
29. See Silk (2008, ch. 5) on the meaning of vārika as a monastic functionary in Buddhist sources. He observes 
that this sometimes verged on a rather menial status, as in the case of the upadhivārika, something like a sexton or 
caretaker in the monastery, responsible in various sources for tending the monastery when the monks were away, 
cleaning, setting out seats and incense, and announcing the date every evening (110–13). In this respect, it can be 
reconciled with the explanation of some epigraphical usage proposed by Tewari (1987: 210): “household attendants 
of the kings whose main duty was to fetch water and attend to the bath of the king,” although the association with 
bathing in particular is based on a dubious connection with the word vāri ‘water’.
30. According to Sohoni (1987: 277), “words spoken by talking birds” (!?). Could syālī ‘wife’s sister’ be 
meant? KAŚ 3.11.28 puts the syāla ‘wife’s brother’ at the head of its list of persons excluded from serving as wit-
ness, and although most of those listed are allowed in cases of assault, the syāla is one of three explicitly excluded 
even in that case.
31. Cf. BṛhSm 1.1.165: gavāṃ pracāre gopālāḥ sasyārambhe kṛṣīvalāḥ in connection with summons to court 
(āhvāna), and in the list of those who should not be detained (anāsedhyaḥ).
234 Journal of the American Oriental Society 135.2 (2015)
[sthiti 21] gṛhāpaṇasthitānāṃ mudrāpatrakadūtakaiḥ sāhasavarjjam āhvānaṃ na karaṇīyaṃ |
While they are at home or in the market, persons should not be summoned to court by messen-
gers with sealed letter except in the case of violent crime.
[sthiti 22] pareṇārthābhiyuktānāṃ vādapratisamāsane yajñasatravivāhādiṣu āhvānaṃ na 
kārayet |
One may not summon those accused by another 32 in a case to refute the charges while [they are 
involved] in a yajña (Vedic sacrifice), a sattra (longterm Vedic performance), 33 a wedding, 
or the like.
[sthiti 23] ṛṇādānābhilekhitavyavahāre akāṣṭhalohabaddhena kṛtapratibhuvena guptir upāsyā |
In the case of a written complaint for the nonpayment of a debt, one who has provided a surety 
may expect [the court’s] protection, 34 and not be fettered by wood or iron (i.e., by cangue 
or joug).
[sthiti 24] varṣāsu svaviṣayāt bījārttham āgatakakarṣakāḥ svāminā na grāhyāḥ | 
Cultivators who have come from their own districts during the rainy season for seed may not be 
detained by a landowner.
 [Market regulations]
[sthiti 25] āṣāḍhamāsi pauṣe ca draṣṭavyaṃ mānapautavaṃ ādāne rūpakaḥ sapādaḥ saha 
dhārmmikeṇa |
Weights and measures are to inspected in the months of Āṣāḍha (June-July) and Pauṣa (Decem-
ber-January); as fee (ādāne): 11⁄4 rupees including charity tax (dhārmika). 35
[sthiti 26] asaṃvādya vyavaharataḥ śulkādikaṃ ca dhānyādi praveśayato niṣkāśayato vā śulkam 
aṣṭaguṇaṃ dāpyaḥ |
An eightfold tax [i.e., 10 rupees] is to be paid by one who is doing business and bringing in or 
disposing of taxable grain or the like without consent [of the authorities].
[sthiti 27] peṭavikavārikeṇa paṃcarātrake paṃcarātrake karttavyam argghanivedanaṃ anive-
dayato vinaye rūpakāḥ ṣaḍ dhārmmike pādaḥ |
Announcing of prices should be done every fifth night by the peṭavika-vārika (market [?] 
manager); 36 as fine for him who does not so announce: 6 rupees; 1⁄4 rupees as charity tax.
[sthiti 28] uttarakulikavārikaiḥ mānabhāṇḍameyagate bahir nna gantavyaṃ |
Managers of the higher families may not go out [of the market] when measures, vessels, or 
goods are missing.
[sthiti 29] uttarakulikavārikāṇām eva karaṇasaṃnidhau chātreṇa trir āghuṣitānā[ṃ*] 
nirupasthānād vinaye rūpakadvayaṃ sapādaṃ saha dhārmmikeṇa |
32. Cf. YDh 2.9c: “One may not countersue someone before [his original] complaint has been resolved, nor 
may a [new] complaint be brought against him by someone else” (abhiyogam anistīrya nainaṃ pratyabhiyojayet, 
abhiyuktaṃ ca nānyena).
33. Bṛhaspati-Smṛti 1.1.136–37: “he who is engaged in a sattra ritual or in marriage rites” (sattrodvāhodyataḥ) 
is among those “who may not be detained” (nāsedhyāḥ).
34. Cf. Kātyāyana-Smṛti (KātySm) 117: “But if the plaintiff does not provide a suitable surety for his suit, he 
should remain under guard, and pay wages to the officer at the end of the day” (atha cet pratibhūr nāsti kāryayogyas 
tu vādinaḥ | sa rakṣito dinasyānte dadyād bhṛtyāya vetanam).
35. dhārmika used in this sense is not found elsewhere; it appears to be a mandatory surcharge of some sort, 
perhaps ostensibly intended to support charitable or religious purposes. The word dharma is commonly used in 
inscriptions to denote a pious act or benefaction.
36. The meaning of peṭavika is unknown. Sircar (1958: 173) suggests a possible connection with Marathi peṭh 
(“a trading town or emporium”).
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If managers even of the higher families do not present themselves before the court registrar when 
called up thrice by the chātra (summoner) they are subject to a fine of 21⁄4 rupees including 
charity tax.
[sthiti 30] vyavahārābhilekhitakakaraṇasevakasyāmadhyāhnād ūrdhvaṃ nirupasthitasya vinayo 
rupakāḥ ṣaṭ sapādās saha dhārmmikeṇa |
For a clerk responsible for recording cases who is not present from midday onwards, the fine is 
61⁄4 rupees including charity tax.
[sthiti 31] āmadhyāhnād ūrdhvam uttarakulikavārikāṇāṃ chalo nāsti |
From midday onwards, [if the court clerk is absent?] managers of the higher families may not 
bring a frivolous complaint (chala). 37
 [Other fines, taxes, and fees]
[sthiti 32] argghavaṃcane rūpakatrayaṃ sapādaṃ saha dhārmmikeṇa |
For deceptive pricing, [the fine is] 31⁄4 rupees including charity tax. [See the set pricing in 27.]
[sthiti 33] mudrāpacāre vinaye rūpakāḥ ṣaṭ sapādāḥ saha dhārmmikeṇa |
For misuse of seals, the fine is 61⁄4 rupees including charity tax.
[sthiti 34] sthāvara[vya]vahāre sāmantaiḥ avasitasya vinaya rūpakaśatam aṣṭottaraṃ 100 8 |
In a real estate suit, if it is settled by neighboring land-holders (sāmantas), the fine [for the losing 
party] is 108 rupees. 38
[sthiti 35] saṃvadane rūpakāḥ catuṣpañcāśat |
[But] if [the court] is informed, [the fine is] 54 rupees.
[sthiti 36] jayike bhāṣā phālāvane cā rūpakatrayaṃ sapādaṃ |
A statement (i.e., certificate?) for the winning party, and for settling the tax-assessment: 31⁄4 rupees. 39
[sthiti 37] ullaṃbane karṇṇatroṭane ca vinayo rūpakāḥ saptaviṃśat |
For suspending [someone] and for tearing the ear, the fine is 27 rupees. 40
[sthiti 38] vākpāruṣyadaṇḍapāruṣyayoḥ vinaye rūpakāḥ ṣaṭ sapādāḥ |
For verbal or physical assault, the fine is 61⁄4 rupees.
[sthiti 39] kṣatadarśane rūpakāḥ aṣṭācatvāriṃśat |
When the injury is visible, 48 rupees. 41
[sthiti 40] gavāṃ tauṇḍike vi[ṃ*]śopakāḥ paṃca |
When cows [damage property] with their mouths, [the fine is] five-twentieths [of a rupee].
[sthiti 41] mahiṣyās ta[d*]dviguṇam |
Twice that if it is done by a water buffalo. 42
37. This and the preceding sthiti both appear to concern complaints brought late in the day, when the proper 
official was apt to be absent. As in sthitis 6, 7, and 9 above, the word chala seems to mean a complaint falling short 
of a properly registered case. The term is discussed further below.
38. My translation follows the suggestions of Gopal (1963: 22), who points out that here and in similar 
Dharmaśāstra rules, the term sāmanta should be understood as ‘neighbor’.
39. My translation assumes that we have here an early form of the land-assessment term surviving in Gujarati 
phāḷavaṇī and Marathi phāḷaṇī (“Settling the phāḷā [cess upon the ryots]”: Molesworth 1857: 553). The phonologi-
cal disparity might well be due to Sanskritic back-formation from a Prakritic form, or simply inconsistent orthogra-
phy. Other interpretations of phālāvane that have been offered make little sense.
40. Suspending and cutting of ears (and nose) are punishments listed in the Arthaśāstra (4.8.22; 4.10.10, etc.), 
but here malicious injuries seem to be meant.
41. VDh 5.66–67 prescribes a fine of 32 paṇas if there is no blood, but if there is blood, 64 paṇas.
42. A double fine for harm done by a buffalo is likewise prescribed, e.g., in YDh 2.159 and NDh 11.28.
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[sthiti 42] madyabhājanasyāvalokye rūpakāḥ paṃca |
For inspection of a wine vessel, 5 rupees.
[sthiti 43] prathamabhājane dhārmmi[ke] adhikaraṇasya rūpakadvaya[ṃ] sārdha[ṃ*] rū 21⁄2 |
For a first [use of a] vessel, 2½ rupees as charitable dues [payable directly] to the court.
[sthiti 44] anāpṛṣṭvā sandhayato dvitīye ’hani taddviguṇaṃ dāpyaḥ |
For one who brews on a second day without asking leave, he should pay twice that amount.
[sthiti 45] surākara[ṇa]syāvalokye rūpakatrayaṃ dhārmmike rūpakaḥ sapādaḥ rājārgghikayā 
madyacāturthadvayaṃ 2 |
For inspection of a brewery, [a fee of] 3 rupees, 11⁄4 as charity tax, and 2 quarter-measures of 
wine as “king’s perquisite.”
[sthiti 46] kāṃsyadosyāyudhānāṃ ā[ṣā]ḍhī paurṇṇamāsī bharolakanirodhena grahaṇaka-
praviṣṭaṃ bhavati | grahaṇakeṣu daṇḍako nānusaraṇīyaḥ |
* [A portion?] of brass [and] dosya weapons/utensils goes into the grahaṇaka [royal store-
rooms?] by weighing and restricting (? bharolakanirodhena) at the full moon of Āṣāḍha; 43 a 
penalty [? daṇḍaka] may not be added at the storerooms. 44
[sthiti 47] rājakīyagañje kalvapālavārikeṇa cāturtthaśoṭīhastena meyaṃ muktvā nānyat [ki]ṃcit 
karaṇīyaṃ |
After the kalvapāla-officer, with a quarter-śoṭī measure in his hand, has dispatched the measured 
material to the royal storehouse, he has no other duties.
[sthiti 48] nīlakuṭyādānaṃ [ḍ]uṃphakena deyaṃ rūpakatrayaṃ rū 3 | 
A ḍumphaka must pay 3 rupees as indigo-vat fee.
[sthiti 49] ikṣuvāṭādānaṃ rūpakāḥ dvātriṃśat rū 30 2 dhārmike rūpakadvayaṃ sapādaṃ rū 21⁄4 |
For a sugar-cane grove, 32 rupees; the charity tax, 21⁄4 rupees.
[sthiti 50] allavāṭasyāto ’rddhādānaṃ |
The fee for an alla 45 plantation is half that.
[sthiti 51] yantrakuṭyādānaṃ rūpakatrayaṃ rū 3 dhārmmike rūpakaḥ sapādaḥ |
For an oil-press the fee is 3 rupees; the charity tax, 11⁄4 rupees.
[sthiti 52] varṣaparyyuṣitā vaṇijaḥ prāveśyaṃ śulkātiyātrikaṃ na dāpanīyāḥ nairggamikaṃ 
deyaṃ |
Merchants who have resided [abroad] for a rainy season (or for a year) may not be required to 
pay entry tax and customs duty, 46 [but] departure tax must be paid.
[sthiti 53] bhāṇḍabhṛtavahitrasya śulkātiyātrike | rūpakāḥ dvādaśa | rū 10 2 dhārmmike rūpakaḥ 
sapādaḥ rū 11⁄4 |
As customs duty for a conveyance full of merchandise, 12 rupees; as charity tax, 11⁄4 rupees.
43. Marking the end of the fiscal year, according to Arthaśāstra 2.7.7.
44. Kosambi (1959: 288): “46). The (royal share of) bell-metal utensils is accepted at the (royal) warehouse 
after mass inspection and weight-checking, on Āṣāḍha full-moon. No (other) fee at the (royal) warehouse.”
45. Kosambi: “wet-ginger”; Sircar notes that alla means ‘wet’ in Pali and ‘ginger’ in Prakrit, but also observes 
that the Sanskrit form ārdraka ‘ginger’ occurs in no. 60.
46. Sircar (1958: 176 n. 5) notes that the Divyāvadāna uses atiyātrā in the sense of ‘fare for crossing a bound-
ary’ (Cowell and Neil, 1886: 92, ll. 27–28). Varṣa-paryuṣitā might be expected rather to mean ‘who have resided 
through the rainy season’, but the order in which the levies are mentioned suggests that the merchants are arriving 
from outside first and then departing again.
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[sthiti 54] mahiṣoṣṭrabharakasya rūpakāḥ paṃca sapādāḥ 51⁄4 saha dhārmmikena |
For a buffalo-load or camel-load of goods, 51⁄4 rupees including charity tax.
[sthiti 55] balīvarddādānaṃ rūpakadvayaṃ sārdhaṃ rū 21⁄2 dhārmmike pādaḥ 1⁄4 |
The charge for a bull is 2½ rupees, 1⁄4 rupee for charity tax.
[sthiti 56] garddhabhabharakādāne rūpakaḥ sapādaḥ rū 11⁄4 saha dhārmmikena |
As charge for a donkey-load of goods, 11⁄4 rupees including charity tax.
[sthiti 57] ato ’rddhena poṭṭalikāsa[ṃ]kācitakādānaṃ avalambakasya viṃśopakāḥ paṃca | 1⁄4 |
Half of that is the charge for packages carried with a yoke; for one dangling [bag], 5/20, i.e., 
1⁄4 [rupee].
[sthiti 58] palaśatasya viṃśopakadvayaṃ saha dārmmikena |
For [a package] weighing a hundred palas, 2/20 including charity tax.
[sthiti 59] yathoparilikhitabhāṇḍādānāt dhānyasyārddhādānaṃ |
For grain, the charge is half of the charge for merchandise as written above.
[sthiti 60] ārdrakalakaṭāyāḥ śulkātiyātrike rūpakaḥ sapādaḥ saha dhārmmikeṇa rū 11⁄4 |
As customs duty for a lakaṭā of ginger, 11⁄4 rupees including charity tax.
[sthiti 61] vaṃśabhṛtavahitrasya rūpakāḥ ṣaṭ sapādāḥ saha dhārmmikena rū 6[1⁄4] |
For a conveyance full of bamboo, 61⁄4 rupees including charity tax.
[sthiti 62] [ska]ndhavāhyaṃ dhānyaṃ śulkaṃ na pradāpayet |
No tax shall be charged for grain carried on the shoulders.
[sthiti 63] kaṇikkākustumbarīrājikāprabhṛtīnāṃ varṇṇikāgrahaṇe setikā grāhyā |
A setikā [two handfuls] may be taken as sample of cumin seed, black mustard seed, coriander 
seed, and the like. 47
[sthiti 64] vivāhayajñotsavasīmantonnayaneṣu ca śulkaṃ na pradāpayet |
There shall be no tax charged in connection with weddings, Vedic sacrifices, festivals, and pre-
birth ceremonies.
[sthiti 65] varayātrāyāṃ śulkādiyā[tri]ke (-ātiyātrike) rūpakāḥ dvādaśa | rū 10 paṭṭakadhārmmike 
rūpakadvayaṃ sapādaṃ rū 21⁄4 |
For the customs duty applicable to the procession of the groom in a wedding, 12 rupees, and 11⁄4 
as document-charity tax.
[sthiti 66] madyavahanakasyādāne rūpakāḥ paṃca | rū 5 dhārmmike rūpakaḥ sapādaḥ rū 11⁄4 |
As charge for a conveyance of liquor, 5 rupees, 11⁄4 as charity tax.
[sthiti 67] kha[llabha]raka[sya] rūpakaḥ sapādaḥ saha dhārmmikena rū 11⁄4 |
For a skin-load [of liquor], 11⁄4 rupees including charity tax.
[sthiti 68] kelāyāḥ saṃkācitakasya ca ato ’rddhādāṃ |
And half of that as charge for a kelā [of liquor?] carried with a yoke.
[sthiti 69] pādaghaṭasya viṃśopakāḥ paṃca | saha dhārmmikena |
For a quarter-measure pot [of liquor?], 5/20 including charity tax.
[sthiti 70] kaṭumadye śīdhucāturthatrayaṃ 3 |
In the case of bitter liquor [or: vinegar?], 48 a three-quarter measure of śīdhu.
47. Following Sircar’s understandings of setikā and varṇikā (Sircar 1984: 10).
48. Thus Kosambi.
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[sthiti 71] chimpakakolikapadakārāṇāṃ yathānurūpakarmmaṇaḥ janapadamūlyād rājakule 
’rdhādānaṃ |
For dyers, weavers, and cobblers, the charge owed in the palace is half the public rate for 
comparable work. 49
[sthiti 72] lohakārarathakāranāpitakumbhakāraprabhṛtīnāṃ vārikeṇa viṣṭiḥ karaṇīyā |
Blacksmiths, chariot-makers, barbers, potters, and the like shall perform corvée by order of the 
manager.
[lines 29–31] ye cānye [pū]rvvavalamānakācārās te ’pi mayā samanujñātāḥ yato ’nyarājabhir api 
asmadvaṃśajair anyair vvā sāmānyam ācandrārkārṇṇavagrahanakṣatrakṣitisthitisamakālīnaṃ 
putrapautrānvayaṃ yaśaḥkīrttiphalam adhivāṃchadbhir idam asmat pradattānugrahasthiti 
pātraṃ anumodanīyaṃ pratipālanīyaṃ ceti || dūtako ’tra sandhivigrahādhikaraṇādhikṛta-
Bhaṭṭakaḥ saṃ 600 40 9 śrāvaṇaśu 5 | svahastaḥ śrī-Viṣṇuṣeṇasya || —
And whatever customary norms may already be current, those too I approve, so that other 
kings born in our lineage too, or equally others, may approve and observe this gracious charter 
of laws that has been presented by us desiring a succession of sons and grandsons to endure as 
long as the moon, sun, sea, planets, stars, earth, and land, with glory and fame as its fruit. The 
herald here is Bhaṭṭaka, Chief Officer in the Office of Pacts and War Decrees. Year 649 Śrāvaṇa 
bright 5th. Signed by Śrī Viṣṇuṣeṇa’s own hand.
[lines 32–34] svasti Darpapurāt sāmantāvantiḥ kuśalī [sa]rvvān evātmīyān anyāṃś ca yathā-
sambadhyamānakān bodhayaty astu vo viditaṃ yathā mayaiṣāṃ vaṇiggrāmasya Lohāṭaka-
grāme pra[ti]vasato yeyaṃm uparilikhitā sthitivyavasthā śrī-Viṣṇubhaṭena dattā sā mayāpy 
anumatā yata eṣām uparilikhitasthitipātravyavasthayā prativasatā[ṃ] svapaṇyena cātmānaṃ 
varttayatāṃ ṇa kenacit paripanthanā kāryeti saṃ 300 50 7 kārttikaba 7
Hail! From Darpapura, the vassal lord Avanti, being in good health, informs all his own and 
others whom it may concern: Let it be known to you that, by me, the above-recorded charter of 
statutes of the merchant group residing in Lohāṭa-village, issued by Śrī Viṣṇubhaṭa, is endorsed 
by me as well, so that no one may obstruct those who are residing here in accordance with the 
above-recorded charter of  statutes in writing, and who by their own commerce are sustaining 
themselves. Year 357 Kārttika dark 7th.
To Sircar (1958: 169), these “look like prevalent customary laws without much modifica-
tion.” It is true that many of these rules have no close parallels elsewhere, but Sircar and 
others have allowed the novelties to blind them to signs of textualism. It is has not been noted 
before how many of these rules use technical terminology distinctive of the Dharmaśāstra lit-
erature, especially to designate basic legal categories and roles. These include terms for legal 
process: vyavahāra (‘lawsuit’), āvedana (‘formal complaint’, no. 17; cf. YDh 2.5); for per-
sons appearing in court: arthin (‘plaintiff’) and pratyarthin (‘defendant’), sākṣin (‘witness’, 
no. 17), abhiyukta (‘the accused’, no. 22; cf. YDh 2.9ff.); and for the formal grounds of liti-
gation: vākpāruṣya and daṇḍapāruṣya (verbal assault and physical assault, nos. 18 and 38), 
ṛṇādāna (‘nonpayment of debt’, no. 23). Nos. 27 and 32, dealing with the mechanism for 
the daily setting of prices at market and the fine for ‘price manipulation’ (argha-vañcana), 
parallel the precepts in YDh 2.249–51.
49. Kosambi understands this to mean that these craftsmen are expected to perform their work in the palace at 
half the normal rate. Sircar proposes that kolika = kaulika, chimpaka = Prakrit chimpaya, Gujarati chipo, and that 
padakāra might be shoemaker or a walking hawker of goods (Hindi paukār). Hemacandra uses the word chimpa to 
describe calico fabric.
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Forms of the verb grah- are used in the charter in at least two distinct senses: for the sei-
zure or detention of persons or things by state authorities, and for acceptance of complaints 
(chala) or a suits (vyavahāra) in court. Something quite like the latter usage occurs in Manu:
svabhāvenaiva yad brūyus tad grāhyaṃ vyāvahārikam |
ato yad anyad vibrūyur dharmārthaṃ tad apārthakam || MDh 8.78
Only what [witnesses] declare candidly should be accepted as valid for a suit;
anything different that they may deceitfully declare has no validity for dharma.
The word chala is not used there, although a similar suggestion of deceit or false pretense is 
implied by vibrūyuḥ. Chala, 50 both in Dharmaśāstra and in Nyāya thought, is understood as 
misrepresentation or misleading disputation (MDh 8.49; YDh 2.19; Nyāya-Sūtra 1.2.10–18), 
but here it appears to have a slightly different if similarly negative sense. In sthitis 6, 7, and 9, 
chala relating to certain (unclear) circumstances is rejected; the other rules with which these 
are grouped (sthitis 5 and 8) concern the acceptance of a lawsuit (vyavahāra). In this context, 
chala may mean ‘frivolous complaint’ or ‘unsubstantiated charge’. The one other occurrence 
of the word is in sthiti 31, which should probably be understood in light of the preceding two 
sthitis. All three concern uttara-kulika-vārikas, a class of market managers apparently of a 
higher order. Sthiti 30 prescribes a penalty if (what appears to be) the registrar of cases in the 
lawcourt is absent after midday, while 31 stipulates that there shall be no chala on the part of 
those market managers during that same time. With no more to go on, I interpret this to mean 
that the court will not consider complaints even from high market officers that come in late 
in the day without properly registering a case. The implication may be that such a complaint 
would be more likely to be frivolous or unsubstantiated.
Arthaśāstra 3.20.22 does use the word in a comparable way, to denote invalid legal claims: 
judges should initiate cases for those who are unable to do so for themselves, and “may not 
dismiss [such cases] on the pretext of place, time, or ‘enjoyment’ [i.e., another party’s claim 
based on longtime possession and use of the property in question]” (na ca deśa-kāla-bhogac-
chalenātihareyuḥ). Dismissing a case on the basis of a false pretext or spurious claim is itself 
a punishable offense (KAŚ 4.9.15). Indeed, our charter may provide a better understanding of 
a maxim found here and in Dharmaśāstra:
evaṃ kāryāṇi dharmasthāḥ kuryur acchala-darśinaḥ |
samāḥ sarveṣu bhāveṣu viśvāsyā loka-sampriyāḥ || KAŚ 3.20.24
In this way, Justices should try lawsuits without engaging in deceit, being impartial to all per-
sons, inspiring trust, and being loved by the people. (Olivelle 2013: 222)
I suggest that the first line ought to be understood as: “In this way, justices should try law-
suits without considering false claims. . . .”
Although the Dharmaśāstras use the word grāhya to affirm or deny what statements 
are “admissible” in a suit, 51 they and the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra also use forms of grah- to 
mean ‘arrest, detain’ (e.g., KAŚ 2.36.38, 3.11.22–24, 4.8.5, 7.5.22; YDh 2.283). But whereas 
YDh 2.266–69 offers a number of possible justifications for “arrest on suspicion” (śaṅkayā 
grāhyaḥ) and the Arthaśāstra allows arrest of a “suspect” (śaṅkitaka) within three days of the 
50. On the term chala in this record, Sircar writes (1966: 72): “(IE 8–8), meaning uncertain; probably, a pretext. 
(El 30), probably, a plea, or persecution, prosecution.”
51. E.g., YDh 2.20, 78; BṛhSm 1.1.170–75; 1.2.17; 1.3.2, 27; 1.8.43; KātySm 193, 206.
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crime (4.8.5), this is by contrast explicitly and (it seems) generally prohibited by the fourth 
statute of our charter. 52
The fifth rule has a parallel in the Arthaśāstra. KAŚ 3.11.22–24 stipulates that a wife may 
not be arrested (agrāhya) for her husband’s unpaid debt unless she was a formal party to 
it (or unless they belong to certain groups; cf. YDh 2.48; NSm 1.15–16), though a husband 
may be arrested for his wife’s debt if it arose from his leaving her without financial support.
There are at least two ways of explaining the obtrusive presence of this legal terminology. 
Either it reflects the influence of the Brahmanical codes, or else the Brahmanical śāstras may 
be codifying legal conceptions and institutions already current in practice. The fact that the 
inscription is in Sanskrit rather than Prakrit makes the former scenario of top-down influence 
a bit more likely; if the legal terms were drawn from common use in the courts, one might 
have expected more Prakritisms even in a Sanskrit record. On the other hand, the use of the 
word chala found here might reflect a usage distinct from that of scholastic discourse.
Of course, this need not be an either/or dichotomy. It is likely that Dharmaśāstra has 
picked up and formalized elements of an untextualized practical legal system; it should not 
be astonishing if systems of legal practice have been influenced by some of the techni-
cal elements of Sanskritic discourse. But there are other signs that this charter was drafted 
by someone quite conversant with Dharmaśāstra. For example, among those excused from 
peremptory summons to court are “those engaged in yajña, sattra, or wedding rites, and the 
like” (sthiti 22). One can understand a rule protecting the sanctity of a wedding or funeral 
ceremony, but the yajña (Vedic sacrifice) at the head of the list stands out as a particularly 
Brahmin concern, and one certainly wonders why the sattra is mentioned: sattras are Vedic 
rites that can be performed only by Vedic Brahmin priests, so it should in theory be of no 
relevance to a guild of merchants. Its inclusion here can only be explained by its being 
modeled on a śāstric rule such as Bṛhaspati-Smṛti 1.1.136–37, which includes “him who is 
engaged in a sattra ritual or in marriage rites” (sattrodvāhodyataḥ) in the list of persons “who 
may not be detained” (nāsedhyāḥ).
The most important parallel with Dharmaśāstra, to my eye at least, is the provision tacked 
on at the end of the list of statutes: “And whatever customary norms may already be current, 
those too I approve.” Sweeping acknowledgments of customary norms occur also in the 
Sanskrit codes: 53
jāti-jānapadān dharmān śreṇī-dharmāṃś ca dharmavit |
samīkṣya kuladharmāṃś ca svadharmaṃ pratipādayet || MDh 8.41
He who knows the Law should examine the Laws of castes, regions, guilds, and families, and 
only then settle the Law specific to each.
sadbhir ācaritaṃ yat syād dhārmikaiś ca dvijātibhiḥ |
tad deśa-kula-jātīnām aviruddhaṃ prakalpayet || MDh 8.46
He should ratify the acknowledged practices of virtuous men and righteous twice-born individu-
als, if such practices do not conflict with those of a particular region, family, or caste.
52. Sthiti 4 seems to imply a distinction analogous to the one between avaṣṭambhābhiyoga ‘accusation based on 
certainty’ and śaṅkābhiyoga ‘accusation on suspicion’ made by Vijñāneśvara in his Mitākṣarā comments on ordeals 
in YDh 2.96. Brick (2010: 32–33) understands avaṣṭambhābhiyoga to imply an accusation formally registered in 
a court of law (in which case women and certain other classes of person cannot perform an ordeal), in contrast to 
“general suspicion of guilt” without formal indictment, which the accused may seek to dispel by undergoing an 
ordeal at his or her own initiative and expense, even if she be a woman.
53. All four Dharmasūtras recognize the validity of similar local variations of dharma: ĀpDhS 2.14.7, 2.15.1, 
2.17.17; BDhS 1.2.1–8, 1.11.26; GDhS 11.20–22; VDhS 1.17, 19.7.
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The Arthaśāstra invokes the same principle more specifically as applying in the regulating 
of transactions (vyavahāra-sthāpanā):
sve sve tu varge deśe kāle ca svakaraṇakṛtāḥ sampūrṇācārāḥ śuddhadeśā dṛṣṭarūpa lakṣaṇa-
pramāṇaguṇāḥ sarvavyavahārāḥ sidhyeyuḥ || KAŚ 3.1.15
In each respective group, however, all transactions shall be valid when they are executed at 
the proper place and time, by someone with proof of ownership, observing all the formalities 
[ācāras], with valid documentation, and noting down the appearance, distinctive marks, quan-
tity, and quality. [tr. Olivelle]
But it is striking to see such a ratification ordained in the first person by an actual ruler.
Now it may be that it was Viṣṇuṣeṇa, or his Brahmin adviser, who was responsible for 
Sanskritizing a set of customary rules. Virkus supposes something similar with regard to the 
epigraphical legalese in the charter (2004: 146):
Although its significance as testimony for the state of affairs in general in western and northern 
India in the sixth century should not be overestimated, nevertheless it does provide clues about 
which questions of economic life, legal and tax structure, as well as administration were regu-
lar and stable at a rather local level. This does not exclude the possibility, as has been noted, 
that Viṣṇuṣeṇa regarded the issuing of the document demanded of him as an opportunity to 
enforce his own aspirations and wishes as well. Herein may lie an explanation for the fact that 
the inscription exhibits some external elements that are characteristic of land-grant documents 
(address formula, appointment of a dūtaka). 54
We may even discern his own aspirations in the decree with which Viṣṇuṣeṇa closes his 
preamble:
tan mayā bhūtapūrvvasya janapadasyābhūtapūrvvasya ca parirakṣaṇa sanniveśanā yātmīyaṃ 
sthitipātraṃ prasādīkṛtaṃ
So I have graciously issued my own charter of  statutes in order to protect and settle the 
country side, both the previously established [areas] and those which are not.
It may be no coincidence that this parallels the phrasing with which the Arthaśāstra intro-
duces the king’s duties: 55
bhūtapūrvam abhūtapūrvaṃ vā janapadaṃ . . . vā niveśayet || KAŚ 2.1.1
He should settle the countryside, whether it has been settled before or not . . .
Be that as it may, we can certainly observe that both authors (Viṣṇuṣeṇa and his successor, 
Avanti) are quite conscious of the charter as a physical text and an authoritative document, 
alluding to it directly five times in varying terms as a charter (pātra) or settlement (vyavasthā) 
of statutes (sthiti) or customary statutes (ācārasthiti). In his endorsement, Avanti twice refers 
to the “above-written charter.” Even certain statutes cross reference others: statute 59 cites 
“the charge for merchandise as written above (yathoparilikhita-),” probably referring to the 
various rates detailed in statutes 53–58. So while it is likely that the ācāras of other social 
groups were crystalized in rules transmitted orally written on perishable materials, we cannot 
54. “Obwohl ihre Bedeutung als Zeugnis für die in West- und Nordindien insgesamt im 6. Jh. bestehenden Ver-
haltnisse nicht zu hoch veranschlagt werden sollte, liefert sie doch Hinweise darauf, welche Fragen des Wirtschafts-
lebens, des Rechts- und Steuerwesens sowie der Verwaltung eher auf lokaler Ebene geregelt oder entschieden 
wurden. Dies schließt, wie bemerkt, nicht aus, daß Viṣṇuṣeṇa die ihm abverlangte Ausfertigung der Urkunde als 
Gelegenheit ansah, auch eigenen Bestrebungen und Wünschen Geltung zu verschaffen. Hierin liegt möglicherweise 
eine Erklärung dafür, daß die Inschrift einige äußere Elemente, die für Landschenkungsurkunden charakteristisch 
sind (Adreßformel, Einsetzung eines dūtaka), aufweist.”
55. This parallel was pointed out to me by Mark McClish (p.c.).
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be sure whether or not the rendering of these rules in Sanskrit, as a permanent written docu-
ment, simultaneously endowed them with a more śāstric character.
Other Records of Sthitis
Even if, in presenting an entire code, the Charter of Viṣṇuṣeṇa remains an outlier among 
surviving early inscriptions, other Gupta-era records attest to the notion that customary prac-
tice could be invoked as law before official decision-making bodies. Thus a copper-plate 
record of 432–33 from Bengal 56 during the reign of Kumāragupta I seems to record that a 
brahmin petitioned a court to be granted endowed lands according to local rules:
[1] - - - - - - [sa*]mvatsara-śa[te] trayodaśotta[re*]
[2] [saṃ100+10+3*] - - - - [asyān di]vasa-pūrvvāyāṃ paramadaivata-para-
[3] [ma-bhaṭṭāraka-mahārājādhirāja-śrī-kumāragupte pṛthivīpatī*] -  - kuṭu[mbi] . . .  -  - 
brāhmaṇa-śivaśarmma-nāgaśarmma-maha-
[4]  - - - - vakīrtti-kshemadatta-goṣṭhaka-varggapāla-piṅgala-śuṅkaka-kāla-
[5]  - - - - viṣṇu-[deva]śarmma-viṣṇubhadra-khāsaka-rāmaka-gopāla-
[6]  - - - - śrībhadra-somapāla-rāmādyaka(?)-grāmāṣṭakulādhikaraṇaś ca
[7]  - - - - viṣṇunā vijñapitā iha khādāpāra-viṣaye nuvṛtta-maryyādāsthi[ti]-
[8]  - - nīvīdharmm[ā]kṣayeṇa labhya[te] . [ta]darhatha mamādyānenaiva kkramena(ṇa) 
dā[tuṃ]
[9]  - - sametyā(?)bhihitai[ḥ*] sarvvam eva * * kara-prativeśi(?)-kuṭumbibhir avasthāpya ka-
[10] - - * ri * kana * yadito * * [ta]d avadhṛtam iti yatas tatheti pratipādya
[11] - - - - [aṣṭaka-na*]vaka-nalā[bhyā]m apaviṃcya kṣetra-kulyavāpam ekaṃ dattaṃ . tataḥ 
āyuktaka
[12] - - * bhrātṛkaṭaka-vāstavya-chandoga-brāhmaṇa-varāhasvāmino dattaṃ
. . . In the year one hundred thirteen [Gupta Era] . . . on the above-mentioned day, during the 
reign of the most devout, most venerable king of kings, King Kumāragupta . . . householder 
. . . brahmin Śivaśarman, Nāgaśarman, [and others,] and the eight-family court of  the village 
(grāmāṣṭakulādhikaraṇa) 57 . . . were petitioned by ***viṣṇu: “Here in this district of Khāṭāpāra, 
[according to?] the customary rule in practice . . . is acquired by dissolving the capital 
endowment ([a]nuvṛtta-maryyādā-sthi[ti] . . . nīvīdharmmakṣayeṇa labhya[te]). So you should 
today give to me accordingly.” . . . When the aforenamed individuals had gathered, and every-
thing had been settled by the neighboring landholders, . . . and they had given their assent to 
the arrangement, saying “that is agreed upon,” . . . a one-kulāvāpa field measuring eight by 
nine nalas was detached and given. Then, this land was given by the official (āyuktaka) . . . to 
Varāhasvāmin, a Chandoga brahmin from Bhārtṛkaṭaka. [Imprecatory verses follow.]
A stone inscription from the Chālukya Deccan, around 725, preserves a charter drafted in 
Sanskritized Kannada: 58
[1–5] [ōm] svasti śrī-Vikramāditya-yuvarājar Porigeṟeyā mahājannakkuṃ nagarakkuṃ 
padineṇṭuṃ prakṛtigaḷguṃ koṭṭa ācāra-vyavasthī(sthe).
[5–10] rāja-puruṣar mmanegaḷoḷ viḍillādadu rājadattaṃ rājaśrāvitaṃ saptra(tpra)me maryyāde 
tāṃbra-śāsanaṃ bhuktānubhōgaṃ [* *] ayduṃ dharmmadā jīvitaṅgaḷān kāvodu.
[10–14] idu mahājanakke nagara-maryyāde mane vīḍillādadu ōralke ormme Vaiśākha-māsaduḷ 
dēśādhipatigaḷ apporgge kuḍuva teṟe uttamam appa okkal [mi *]
56. Dhanaidaha Copper-Plate, EI 17.23 (Basak 1923–24).
57. For the institution, see Bhandarkar’s remarks in CII 3, 2e, 286 n. 7.
58. Lakṣmeśvara Kannada stone inscription of the Cālukya Yuvarāja Vikramāditya II of about 725 c.e., edited 
and partially translated in EI 14.14 by Barnett (1917–18: 190–91).
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[18–23] puṭṭige ma[*] cōra-pāka-daṇḍa-daśāparādhaṃgaḷ appav ellaṃ pūrvvācāraṃ a[pu]
tradhanam envodu tāne illi s[ē]ṇig[e] Kārttikamāsaduḷ koḍuvadu . . .
Hail! [this is] the charter of customary rules (ācāra-vyavasthe) which the Heir-Apparent 
Vikramāditya has granted to the Brahmins, the townspeople, and the eighteen social groups 
(prakṛtis) 59 of Porigeṟe:
The king’s officers are to protect vacant houses, royal gifts, royal proclamations, the authority 
of good men, local laws, copper-plate edicts, continued possession of property possessed . . . the 
lives of [those who bestow?] the five dharmas. . . .
This is the municipal law for Brahmins: each occupied house shall pay a tax once per year in 
the month of Vaiśākha to the district governors; each house individually [shall pay] for festival 
expenses (?), the highest households [paying] ten paṇas, middling households seven paṇas, the 
lower, five, and the lowest, three. All already established customs such as puṭṭige [. . .] fines for 
theft and misdemeanors (pāka?), for the ten offences, and likewise what is known as the prop-
erty of persons without heir—these are to be paid to the guild there in the month of Kārttika . . .
Obligations to the guild of braziers and the guild of oil-pressers are mentioned further on, 
though the record becomes increasingly illegible and obscure.
A final example of a decree recognizing customary norms concerns practices associated 
with marriage. In the late eleventh century, the governor of Vengi, a son of the reigning East-
ern Cālukya king Kulottuṅga I, issued an edict (śāsana) confirming the ceremonial privileges 
claimed by a cluster of families based on a formal recognition of old customary norms: 60
[83] . . . ma[nne]ṭimahendramadhyavarttino rāṣṭrakūṭapramukhān kuṭiṃbinas sa-
[84] rvvān samāhūya maṃtripurohitasenāpatiyuvarājadauvārikapradhānasamakṣam ittham 
ājñ[ā]paya-
[85] ti | yathā . saṃti madvaṃśabhūpālapādapadmopajīvinaḥ . bhṛtyāḥ kṛtyavidhau dakṣāḥ 
śauryyādiguṇaśālinaḥ | [v. 37] tanmadhye
[86] parayā bhaktyā śaktyā ca prajñayā sadā . madīyānvayabhūpālacittārādhanatatparā .  
[v. 38] nijair a[r*]tthair nnijaiḥ prāṇai-
[87] r vvikramādyai[r*] gguṇair nnijai[ḥ*] . ye cālukyakṣitīśānāṃ prastāvapratipālinaḥ .  
[v. 39] ayo[dhy]ādhīśvareṇā-
[88] dau dakṣiṇāśājayaiṣiṇā . ye sahaiva samāyātā vijayādityabhū-
[89] bhuj[ā] . [v. 40] rā[ja]vaṃśāvaraṃsānā[*ṃ] rājadhānyā mahībhuj[ā]ṃ . puro vijayavāṭeyā
[90] ye vāstavyakuṭuṃbinaḥ | [v. 41] ye ca velumanūllu pattipālu nariyūllu kumuḍāllu ma-
[91] ṟṟūllu povaṇḍlu srāvakulu uṇḍrūllu anumagoṇḍalu aḍḍanūllu ityādi[ku]-
[92] [la]sahasramedaprasiddhāḥ teli[ki]kulalabdhajanmā[naḥ*] svadharmmakarmmaniṣṭhita
mahasa[s te]ṣām a-
[93] mīṣāṃ vijayavāṭapramukhanikhilapuranāgaragrāmapaṭṭanaprabhṛ-
[94] tiṣu sthāneṣu sarvveṣu vivāhotsaveṣu pravarttamāneṣu midhunasya vī[thī]ṣu turagā-
[95] rohaṇena paryyaṭanam adha vivāhotsavāvasāne rājaśrīpādamūle mahārggha-
[96] vāsoyugalu[ṃ* [i.e., yugalam]] nithāya [i.e., nidhāya] praṇatānām eṣāṃ kanakapātreṇa 
tāṃbūlapradānaṃ ca pū-
[97] rvvamaryyādā[sa]māgatam adhunā paramabhak[t*]iparitoṣitair asm[ā*]bhir 
ācaṃdrārkka
[98] ṃ śāsanokṛtya dattam iti viditam astu vaḥ . dharmmo yam asmadvaṃśajaiḥ pā-
[99] rtthivaiḥ prayatnena pālanīyaṃ . . . .
59. On this term, see Barnett’s note (1917–18: 189 n. 1).
60. Teki Plates of Rājarāja-Choḍagaṅga of 1086–87 c.e., EI 6.35 (Hultzsch 1900–1); translation and trans-
literation slightly updated.
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[108] . . .|| śrīvijayarājya[saṃ]vatsara saptadaśe dattasyāsya śāsana[sy][ā*]jñaptiḥ 
kaṭakādhipaḥ karttā
[109] viddaya(bhaṃ)bhaṭṭaḥ lekhaka[ḥ*] pennācāryyaḥ ||
[While Rājarāja Choḍagaṅga was ruling the whole earth, he] called together all the Rāṣṭrakūṭas 
and other peasants living between the Mannēṟu (river) and the Mahendra (mountain) and issued 
the following order (ittham ājñāpayati) in the presence of the councillors, the family priest, the 
commander of the army, the heir-apparent, the door-keepers, and the ministers:
[vv. 38–41] “[Among my family’s many servants, those] who have protected the Cālukya kings 
at the beginning with their riches, with their lives, (and) with their courage and other virtues; 
who have come already at the beginning with king Vijayāditya, the lord of Ayodhyā, who was 
desirous of conquering the southern region; the peasants dwelling in the town Vijayavāṭā, the 
capital of the kings (who were) ornaments of the race of the Moon (Rājavaṃśa);
[90] “And who are born in the Teliki family, whose minds are intent on the performance of their 
duties, (and) who are known to be divided into a thousand families such as Velumanūllu, Pattipālu, 
Nariyūllu, Kumuḍāllu, Maṟṟūllu, Pavaṇḍlu, Srāvakulu, Uṇḍrūllu, Anumagoṇḍalu, and Aḍḍanūllu.
[92] “Be it known to you that, being pleased by (their) great devotion, we have now granted 
to these people by a decree (śāsana), as long as the moon and sun shall last, that when mar-
riage festivals are celebrated at all places such as Vijayavāṭa and all other towns, cities, vil-
lages, and hamlets (?), the married couple may proceed on the roads on horse-back, and that 
afterwards when, at the end of the marriage festival, they place a pair of valuable cloths at 
the feet of the king and prostrate themselves, betel will be given (to them) in a golden vessel, 
(as) handed down by old custom.
“This dharma must be assiduously protected by the kings descended from our family.” 
[Imprecatory verses follow.]
The executor (ājñapti) of this edict, which was given in the seventeenth year of the prosper-
ous and victorious reign, (was) the commander of the camp (kaṭakādhipa); the composer, 
Viddayabhaṭṭa; (and) the writer Pennācārya.
The authoritative basis for the decree is that the norm has been “handed down by prior cus-
tom” (pūrva-maryādā-samāgatam), what in English Common Law is called “immemorial 
custom.” The circumstances in which this custom was contested we do not know, but making 
it the object of a royal decree—the word śāsana denotes the order and the physical document 
equally—adds an implicit threat of enforcement. The enactment is further called a dharma, a 
multivalent usage implying both the legal act itself and the principle that underlies it. It bears 
emphasizing that, as the Dharmasūtras quoted above affirm (pace Austin), a customary rule 
like this is a dharma even before a king ratifies it or throws the force of the state behind it.
Criminal Law Promulgated by a Brahmin Council without Royal Order
We must wait until the twelfth century for an unambiguous example of legislation by 
caste council that is given public written form: the stone slab found in Lāhaḍapura, Gazipur 
District (Uttar Pradesh). It records an agreement (a saṃvid) reached by the local Brahmins 
(dvijas) in 1173, which by virtue of being inscribed constitutes a sthiti, a fixed statute, pre-
scribing the punishments appropriate to crimes against the village, including cattle-rustling. 
Separate sanctions are prescribed for the brigand (presumed to come from outside) and any 
local “accessory” (upastambhadāyaka) who may connive with him:
[1] (siddham) svasti | śrījayaccaṃdradevasya rājye saṃvatsare mite |
[2] khāgnyarkkaiḥ 1230 āśvine māse pakṣe [kṛṣṇe]
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[3] dine vudhe || dvādaśyāṃ 12 lāhaḍayure racitesā s[thit]i-
[4] r dvijaiḥ | vaṭuṭuṃṭābhibhūtais tai[ḥ*] kṛtā saṃvit samāgataiḥ |
[5] yo smākaṃ pa[r]ivādena kuryād grāmasya luṃṭanaṃ | droha-
[6] m anyaprakāraṃ vā gomahiṣyādi[ve]ṣṭanaṃ || tasya cakṣurvvadhaḥ
[7] kāryaḥ sarvvasvaharaṇaṃ tathā | bhaṃktvā gṛhaṃ [ca] niṣkā-
[8] lyas tasyopaṣṭaṃbhadāyakaḥ | vimaṃntā vārayaṃs tu-
[9] lyaḥ sa śvacaṃḍālagarddabhaiḥ | dvādaśārkvaś ca bha-
[10] gavā[n i]ha sākṣīti siddhyatāṃ ||
Success! Blessings! In the reign of Śrī Jayaccandradeva, in the year equal to the rays [12] of the 
fire [3] in the sky [0], 1230, on Wednesday, in the dark half of the month of Āśvina, on the twelfth 
(12th), in Lāhaḍapura, this statute (sthiti) is drawn up by the Dvijas, [as] an agreement (saṃvid) 
made by those who gathered, having been tormented by brigandry (vaṭuṭuṃṭa, i.e., baṭuluṇṭa):
“Whoever, spiting us, plunders the village, or does any other sort of treachery, [such as] 
rustling the cows, buffaloes, or other herds, they should kill him on sight (cakṣurvadha) and 
seize all his property. They should drive away his [local] accomplice after destroying his 
house. Disrespectful, obstructive, he is like a dog, Caṇḍāla (low-caste man), or donkey. So 
may it be accomplished, as the Lord of Twelve Lights (the sun) is witness here.” 61
This inscription stands out from the mass of contemporary records in several respects. It 
makes no reference to royal authority other than to date the decision to the reign of a king. It 
is quite short, consisting wholly of five anuṣṭubh verses in Sanskrit, containing the substance 
of the law, with no introductory praśasti (royal panegyric) or concluding formulas. The fact 
that it was inscribed on a stone slab suggests that it was meant to be on public view. But it 
may not have been associated with any temple, and the only deity mentioned is the Sun, who 
(as so often in oaths) is invoked as universal witness to the enactment. So a public, civic 
context is likely.
The text, being in Sanskrit verse, could not be presumed to be understood by all and sun-
dry, but if it were meant to apply only (or mainly) within a Brahmin village it may still be 
considered as being for public edification.
No formal governing body (viz., sabhā) is explicitly mentioned, although such a body 
may be implicit in the attribution of the decision to the “twice-born.” Given that the record 
is composed in verse, the choice of terminology may be dictated by metrical or stylistic con-
cerns. In short, we seem to have here a piece of legislation promulgated formally by a local 
body, and publicized in a polished written form.
From the other end of the subcontinent, less than fifty years later, we find a Tamil temple 
inscription recording a resolution by a local non-Brahmin assembly (naṭu) to provide pro-
tection to cultivators (kuṭimakkaḷ) of several villages attached to the temple. 62 As in the 
Lāhaḍapura sthiti, the rule addresses the problem of “cattle rustling and other mischief”:
[3] . . . irājarājavaḷanāṭṭu vallanāṭṭu - - -
[4] kūrapparattālvutevimaṅkalattu nāṭā icainta nāṭṭom eṅkaḷil icaintu uṭaiyār ti-
[5] ruvaraṉkuḷamuṭaiya nāyaṉār tiruppati tevuntiruvumuṭaiyāṉ tirumaṇṭapa[ttu] nāṭāy
[6] kuṟaivaṟakkūṭi iruntu kaṟkaṭakanāyiṟṟu muṉṟāntiyeti nāḷ icaivutiṭṭumiṭṭu kalveṭṭi
[7] kuṭuttapparicāvatu . innāyaṉār tiruppatiyil nālu varattukkuḷḷu irunta kuṭimakkaḷai no-
[8] kkuvom ākavu[m*] . puṟattevatāṉaṅkaḷaiyuṅ kuṭimakkaḷaiyu[m*] no[k*]kuvom ākavum . 
no[k*]kum iṭatta [ma]ṟi[ttu] - - -
61. Sircar 1959 (= EI 32.36); my translation.
62. Haratīrtheśvara Temple, Tiruvarangulam, Alangudi Taluk, 1218–19 (Inscriptions in the Pudukkottai Dis-
trict, no. 176): text as in Kannan 1929: 102–3; translation from Srinivasa Ayyar 1945: 161–63.
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[9] kāli piṭittal maṟṟuñcil citampukaḷ ceytāruṇṭākil nīrnilattile iraṇṭu māc ceyyun 
tirurcūla[kkalve-*]
[10] ṭṭi kuṭuttu paṟicciṉa piṭicīṉa viṭivom ākavum .
We, the members of the nāṭu [local council] of Kūrappāttālvu Caturvetimaṅkalam of Vallanāṭu 
in Rājarājavaḷanāṭu, having met, on the third day of the month of Kaṛkaṭakam in the sacred pavil-
ion of Lord Tēvumtirivum in the holy temple of the Nāyanār of Tiruvarankuḷam, all members 
being present, recorded the following resolution, which we unanimously passed, and inscribed 
it on stone:
“We shall protect the cultivators (kuṭimakkaḷ) residing within bounds of this place sacred 
to the Nāyanār (saints) . . . While they are under our protection, if anyone rustles cattle or 
commits other such mischief, we shall confiscate two mās of wetland and plant the trident 
stone on its boundaries as forfeit to the god, and restore whatever is stolen or plundered. . . .”
We note the double remedy stipulated in case the law be violated: a punitive sanction (con-
fiscation of land, which becomes the divine property) and reparations for the aggrieved party.
Regulation of Administrative Procedures
The Uttaramallūr inscriptions of Parāntaka I (Parakesarivarman, r. from 906) 63 record the 
king’s efforts to reform the administration of a Brahmin settlement (Uttaramerucaturvedi-
maṅgalam), which had been perverted by “wicked men.” In a first attempt, in the twelfth year 
of his reign (918–19), the king sent a non-Brahmin officer called Tattaṉūr Mūvēndavēḷāṉ to 
promulgate a set of rules to regulate the selection of members of three separate committees 
in such a way that power could no longer be concentrated in the hands of a small, corrupt 
group. Two years later, the king had to send a second officer, this time a Brahmin, to refine 
the regulations, presumably so that they would more effectively exclude the selection of cor-
rupt or corruptible members (including recent past members).
The inscriptions take the form of resolutions issued by the sabhā—“we the members of 
the assembly of Uttaramerucaturvedimaṅgalam, with [the king’s officer] sitting with us by 
royal order”:
[11] . . . [i]pparicēy ivvāṇṭu mutal ca[ntr]ā[ditta]vat e[ṉ]ṟum [ku]ṭavōlai [vāri]yamēy iṭuvatāka 
Dēvēntraṉ ca[kra]vatti [śrī] Vīranārāyaṇaṉ śrī Parāntakadēvar āki[ya] Parakēsariva[r]
mar śrīmugam a[ru]ḷuc ceytu va[rakk]āṭṭa
[12] srī āñaiyiṉāl Tattanūr Mū[vē]nta[vē]lānuṭaṉirukka nam grāmatt[u du]ṣṭar koṭṭu śiṣṭar 
varddhi[tti]ṭuvār āka [vyava]sthai cey[tō]m [Ut]taramē[ru*]cca[turvv]ēnimaṇkalat[tu] 
sabh[ai]yōm
. . . The royal letter—which the lord of gods, the emperor, the glorious Vīranārāyaṇa, the glori-
ous Pārāntakadeva Parakesarivarman was pleased to issue to the effect that committees should 
from this year forward be invariably chosen in this way (by drawing) ballots from a pot, for as 
long as the moon and the sun [endure]—having been received and made known to us, we, the 
members of the assembly of Uttaramerucaturvedi mangalam, made (this) settlement, (the king’s 
officer) Tattaṇūr Mūvēndavēlāṉ sitting with us by royal order, in order that the wicked men of 
our village may perish and the rest prosper. [adapted from Venkayya]
The rules stipulate explicitly the qualifications of candidates and ensure a transparent elec-
tion process. There should be one candidate from each of twelve streets in thirty wards, 
whose names should be written on leaves and placed in a pot. To qualify as a candidate, a 
man must be between the ages of thirty-five and seventy, own a minimum amount of taxable 
63. Uttaramallūr inscriptions of Parāntaka I Parakesarivarman, 918–20 (Venkayya 1908).
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land and reside in a house thereon, have learned his Vedic scriptures—higher studies reduce 
the minimum land requirement—be conversant with business, virtuous, with honest earn-
ings, not have served on any committee in the past three years and not be related in any of 
twelve specified ways to any former committee member who has not submitted his accounts, 
and not be guilty of theft or any of a list of unexpiated moral faults (or even expiated ones, 
in some cases). Explicit rules were also given for the public selection of names: in the pres-
ence of temple priests and the full assembly, ward by ward, the names are shaken in a pot 
and drawn out by an illiterate boy, then passed to a state-appointed madhyastha (official in 
charge of issuing documents and certifying legal acts, rather like a notary), who receives the 
leaf on his open palm and reads the name aloud, and passes it to be read out by all the priests. 
Note the emphasis placed on Sanskrit learning, not only for the committee members but also 
in the case of the king’s second deputy sent to deal with the problem.
Statutory Reform of Marriage Practices
An inscription from a small polity in Vijayanagara-controlled Tondaimandalam in south 
India, dated Wednesday, 13 February 1426, records a resolution of a Brahmin council to abro-
gate a disapproved custom (the payment of brideprice) and to replace it with a Dharmaśāstric 
norm (the marriage called ‘gift of a virgin’, kanyādāna). 64 This is ordained henceforth to be 
the only legitimate marriage practice for all Brahmins in the kingdom of Paḍaivīḍu: 65
[1] śubham astu
[2] svasti śrīmaṉmahā-irājādirājaparameśvarāṉa śrī[vī]rapratāpadevarāyamahārāja pri
[3] thivirājyam paṇṇi aruḷāṉiṉṟa śakābdam 1347 eliṉ mel cellāṉi[ṉ]ṟa viśvāvasu-
[4] varuṣam paṅkuṉi m. 3 ṣaṣṭiyu[m] budhaṉ kilamaiyum peṟṟa anilattu [i.e., anuṣattu] nāḷ 
paṭaiviṭṭu irājyattu
[5] aśeṣavidyamahājanaṅkaḷum arkkapuṣkaraṇi gopināthasannadhiyi[l]e
[6] dharmmasthāpanasamayapatram paṇṇi kuṭuttapaṭi iṟṟai nāḷ mutalāka inta-
[7] ppaṭaivīṭṭu rājyattu brāhmaṇaril kaṉṉa[ṭi]kar tamilir teluṅkar ilāḷar mutalā-
[8] ṉa aśeṣagotrattu aśeṣasūtrattil aśeṣaśākh[ai*]yil avakkaḷum vivāham paṇ-
[9] ṇumiṭattu kanyādānamāka vivāham paṇṇakkaṭavar ākavum . kanyādānam paṇṇāmal
[10] poṉ vāṅkip peṇ kuṭuttāl poṉ kuṭuttu vivāham paṉṉiṉāl irājadaṇḍattukkum uṭpaṭṭu
[11] brāhmaṇyattukkum puṟampākak kaṭavāreṉ[ṟu] paṇṇi[na] 
dharmmasthāpanasamayapatram . ippaṭikku aśeṣavidyama-
[12] hājanaṅkaḷ eluttu . . . .
Let there be prosperity! Hail! On the day of (the nakṣatra) Anusham, which corresponds to 
Wednesday, the sixth lunar day, the third (solar day) of the month of Phālgunī of the Viśvāvasu 
year, which was current after the Śaka year 1347 (had passed), while the illustrious king of 
kings and supreme lord, the illustrious Vīrapratāpa-Devarāya-Mahārāja, was pleased to rule 
the earth, the Great Men (brahmins of the assembly) of all branches of sacred studies of the 
kingdom of Paḍaivīḍu drew up, in the presence of (the god) Gopinātha (of) Arkapuṣkariṇī, a 
document (which contains) an agreement fixing the sacred law. According to (this document), 
if the Brāhmaṇas of this kingdom of Paḍaivīḍu, viz., Kaṉṉaḍigas, Tamils, Teluṅgas, Ilāḷas, etc., 
of all gotras, sūtras, and śākhās conclude a marriage, they shall, from this day forward, do it 
by kanyādāna (‘gift of a virgin’). Those who do not adopt kanyādāna, i.e., both those who give 
a girl away after having received gold, and those who conclude a marriage after having given 
64. Viriñcipuram temple inscriptions from the reign of Vīrapratāpadevarāya of Vijayanagara, 1425 (South 
Indian Inscriptions 1 [no. 56]; Hultzsch 1890: 82–84).
65. Discussed also by Davis 2005: 103, and by myself in more detail elsewhere (Lubin 2013: 442–45).
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gold, shall be liable to punishment by the king and shall be excluded from the community of 
Brāhmaṇas. Thus have written the [undersigned] great men of all branches of sacred studies . . .
The rule adopted here takes the form of a statute adopted by a competent legislative 
body, recorded in a ‘document of an agreement establishing a law’ (dharmmasthāpana-
samayapatram), signed by ‘great men learned in every science’ (aśeṣavidyamahājanaṅkaḷ), 
by which are meant the members of the local Brahmin council. Unlike our oldest examples 
of inscribed laws, this, like the Lāhaḍapura and Tiruvaraṅkulam stone inscriptions, records 
a law enacted independently by a Brahmin council but in this case explicitly invoking the 
king’s obligation to enforce it (as well as a social sanction). 66
Just a few decades earlier, the south Indian Dharmaśāstrin Mādhava, a minister in the 
Vijayanagara court, in his commentary on the Parāśara-Smṛti, refined Devaṇṇabhaṭṭa’s ear-
lier defense of the practice of cross-cousin marriage by asserting that Dharmaśāstra precepts 
that seem to prohibit it were only applied to marriages that did not follow the kanyādāna 
model. This is because a women duly given in marriage in this fashion thereby adopts the 
lineage markers (sāpiṇḍya and gotra) of her husband in place of those of her father—she is 
“transsubstantiated,” as Trautmann quips—with the consequence that her brother’s daughter 
is no longer too closely related to become her son’s bride by Dharmaśāstra rules. Hence, it is 
likely that the decision recorded in the Paḍaivīḍu inscription was intended precisely to shore 
up the legitimacy of south Indian Brahmin marriage customs by assuring their conformity to 
the view of perhaps the most influential Dharmaśāstra authority of Vijayanagara-era south 
India. 67 This would certainly constitute a fairly direct, if still tacit, influence of Dharmaśāstra 
on legal practice among Brahmins. The record is explicit, of course, that the decision has no 
bearing on the marriage practices of non-Brahmins.
Consulting Written Records to Resolve a Dispute
Indian inscriptions (and the epigraphy of Southeast Asia, which early on was largely imi-
tative of Indian practice) exemplify a range of types of legal documents: decrees and orders, 
deeds of gift or sale, dispute settlements, administrative appointments, etc. The examples 
discussed here show that at least in a few cases the inscription was used as a means of pub-
lishing statutes, usually within a clearly defined jurisdiction.
Besides inscriptions, the existence of formulary compendia such as the Lekhapaddhati 
(compiled between fourteenth and sixteenth centuries) demonstrates a native awareness of 
the importance of standardization as a means of ensuring clarity, and as an index of authen-
ticity and official status. 68 In the epigraphy itself we can see signs of the same awareness.
One of these signs is the expression of the sentiment that the creation of a document in 
itself is meant to resolve the dispute and to prevent its being reopened in the future. A very 
clear example of this is an extraordinary copper-plate of 1604. It is at once a deed and a vivid 
first-person account by a non-Brahmin legal agent. In it the would-be title-holder explains in 
66. The notion that a decision by a body of learned Brahmins counts as dharma, the recording of such decision 
in a document, the two types of penalty, and the prescribed form of marriage can all be supported (i.e., validated) by 
precepts of Dharmaśāstra, although (as usual) none is cited directly.
67. David Brick, in a personal communication of 24 December 2013, astutely called my attention to the likely 
connection with Mādhava’s famous defense of cross-cousin marriage. For Mādhava’s comments on this subject: 
Chandrakanta Tarkalankara 1890: 465–73; Trautmann 1981 provides an exhaustive analysis of this marriage cus-
tom, including a lengthy discussion of its treatment in Dharmaśāstra, including Mādhava’s views (pp. 304–7); 
Appendix B (pp. 438–46) contains an English translation of Mādhava’s comments.
68. The definitive study, edition, and German translation of this work is Strauch 2002; Prasad 2007 is an English 
translation.
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detail the process by which he obtained rights to lands, sought legal documentation of those 
rights so that his offspring would inherit clear title, and went about making his case. This 
record is relatively “recent” and unusual in its presentation, but the institution and the legal 
process that it represents are probably not greatly different from what they were a few cen-
turies earlier. In it the petitioner states: “I told them that, as I am a shepherd, there might be 
no objection to the right of the sons born to me over the lands that I had acquired, I wanted 
to execute a copper-plate (document).” He repeats that wish a few lines on:
[38] . . . nāṉ yiṭaiyaṉyāṉatāl yirukūm piḷḷai yaḷukku nāṉpēṟṟa kā-
[39] ṇikkum picakuvaṟumal cempuppaṭṭaiyam ceyyavēṉum-m-eṉ-
[40] ṟu colla avarkaḷ coṉṉatu nālu kiṟāmattārai kūṭtivaiy e-
[41] ṉṟu koṉnārkaḷ atuku tamaṟākināṭṭār muṭikaṇṭam pam-
[42] palakār nālukōṭṭai nāṭṭu ampalakār periyakōṭṭai
[43] kkavaṇṭamār kāṟūru kallūruṉikavaṇṭamār kaṉṉāruppu
[44] ampalakār velkuḷa ampalakār ivarkaḷ yaṉavōraiyum kūṭṭi
[45] ālapaṭṭi ālamarataṭiyil kūṭiyirucūṟapōtu naṭuyituyeṉṉa
[46] vayaṉantukāka kūṭṭivacetu yeṉṟu
I told them that, as I am a shepherd, in order that there might be no objection to the right of the 
sons born to me over the lands that I had acquired, I wanted to execute a copper-plate (docu-
ment). They ordered me to summon the inhabitants of the four villages. Accordingly I assembled 
at the foot of the pīpal tree at Alampaṭṭi, Tamarākkināṭṭār, Muḍikaṇḍambalakkār of Periyakōṭṭai, 
the Kavaṇḍars of Kārūru and Kallūruṇi, the Ambalakkārs of Kannāruppu and the Ambalakkār 
of Kalkuḷam. When they asked me why I brought them, I said that I wanted to execute a copper-
plate deed so that there might be no dispute about my own lands. 69
What is remarkable about this case is that we see a relatively humble individual taking 
recourse to a permanent written record in order to secure his legal land rights for his heirs. 
Although it is unusual for such documents to be preserved in metal (as opposed to perishable 
palm leaf), its existence suggests that by this time documentation of this sort was produced 
not only for elites or groups.
Madras Museum Copper-Plate no. 8 provides an even more detailed snapshot of legal 
practice in the sixteenth century. This copper-plate inscription of 1535 concerns a land dispute 
between two individuals with competing claims to hereditary rights. The record notes that 
litigation had dragged on for five years, at great cost. The contending parties, both of whom 
bore the honorific title of mutaliyār (which was conferred upon a variety of officials and 
dignitaries), brought their dispute to be heard by three other mutaliyārs, who in turn brought 
in a fourth. This ad hoc “bench” heard depositions from both sides. Meanwhile, an unnamed 
local potentate referred to simply as the “Rāyar” (“his Highness,” in effect) examined a 
copper-plate grant that had been submitted as evidence. The four mutaliyārs found that Mut-
tiyappa had “no good claim,” and were prepared to give sole rights to Maṉṉakaṭamba, but, 
in consultation with a mutaliyār from a neighboring region, a “settlement” was made accord-
ing to which Muttiyappa (who had been cultivating the lands in dispute, though apparently 
without title, and who had gifted one-twelfth as a religious endowment to Brahmins) was 
granted one-sixth of the total remaining lands, while the rest was restored to Maṉṉakaṭamba:
[3] . . . Poṇṇakari cimaiyil Cin-
[4] nakāmaṇattil irukkum Manṉakkaṭamba Mutaliyār Kā-
[5] ñcivāyal Muttiyappa Mutaliyār yivarkaḷ yirutira-
[6] varum kāṇikāṣṣi nimittiyam oṇṇukoṇ-
69. Setupati copper-plate grant of 1604, edited and translated by Nateśa Śāstrī in Burgess 1886: 62–65.
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[7] ṇu vikātappaṭṭu Ciravarampeṭṭu Akattiyappa Mutaliy-
[8] ār Ṇāṟāyaṇa Mutaliyār Cōnāttiṟi Mutaliyār eṅka-
[9] ḷ mūṇu pēruṭanēyum vantu collikkoḷḷukai-
[10] yil nāṅkaḷ mūṇu pērum Peruvāyal Tiruveṅkaṭa Mu-
[11] taliyāraiyum kūṭa vaccukkoṇṭu ṉaṅkaḷ nālu pēru-
[12] m yirutiravā vākku-mūlam kēlkkum aḷavilum Rāyar cep-
[13] pēṭu pārkkum aḷavilum Kāñcivāyāl Muttiyappa Mutali-
[14] yārukku Cinnakkāvaṇattilē kāṇikāṣṣi muramai
[15] cellātu Rāyar ceppēṭu pārkkum aḷavilum Mannakkaṭa-
[16] mba Mutaliyārukku kāṇikāṣṣi muramai Cinnakāmaṇa-
[17] m mulumaiyum avaṟukkeyallāmal piṉṉai orutta-
[18] rukkuc cellātu āṉapaṭiyiṉāle yivarkal reṇṭu-
[19] pērum añcuvaruṣame vekupaṇam celavaliccupaṭipa-
[20] ntal paṇṇikoṇṭu cilavalicca paṭiyiṉālē ṉāṅkaḷ
[21] ṉālu pērum yōcaṉai paṇṇi Ponnakiri cīmai Amal-Śaṅkara-Mū-
[22] ṟitti Mutaliyār pērukku muṟi muccalikkai yirutiravār
[23] kayilēyum vāṅkikkoṇṭu ṉāṅkal ṉālu pērum
[24] teṟkaṭai paṇṇiṉiga vivaram . . .
[On such and such a date,] Maṉṉakkaḍamba Mudaliyār of Śinnakāmaṇam, which is situat-
ed in the Poṉṉagari country, and Muttiyappa Mudaliyarof Kāñchivāyal had a dispute among 
themselves as to their hereditary right to certain lands. They came to us three—Akattiyappa 
Mudaliyār, Nārāyaṇa Mudaliyār, and Śōṇāttiri Mudaliyār, of Śiravarampeṭṭu—and complained 
about that matter. We three—and taking with us Tiruvēṅkaṭa Mudaliyār of Peruvāyal—thus we 
four, took depositions from their own mouths, from both sides. While we four were so engaged, 
and when the Rāyar was examining the copper-plate, we concluded among ourselves that Mut-
tiyappa Mudaliyār of Kanchivayal had no good claims on his side, that, on the examination of 
the copper-plate by the Rāyar, it would be settled that Maṉṉakkaḍamba Mudaliyār alone had 
the sole right to the whole of the Śinnakāmaṇam village, and that, excepting himself, no other 
person had any kind of right to the said village. But, as both these persons had been spending 
much money for five years to have their disputes settled, we took an agreement from both of 
them to Amal Śaṅkaramūrti Mudali of the country of Poṉṉagari, and settled their dispute in the 
following manner: . . . 70
The document closes with formulas confirming the permanence of the settlement and record-
ing the names of copyist, the engraver, and the four arbitrators. The embedded description 
comes close to sounding like a modern case brief, but the real purpose of the record was to 
provide a rationale for the mediated settlement and the relative weight accorded to the earlier 
copper-plate document and other factors.
conclusion on customary law committed  
to writing in indian inscriptions
The inscriptions considered above illustrate various ways in which customary standards 
could be officially recognized (or, in one case, officially abolished): by a resolution of an 
authoritative body resulting in a publicly displayed legal record or by a ruler setting stan-
dards by public order. In both cases, the written record appears to be instrumental, both as 
a form of publication and as a means of casting the law in a formal and transregionally rec-
70. Nateśa Śāstrī translation in Burgess 1886: 155–56.
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ognizable legal idiom. Although explicit references to Dharmaśāstra are rare, the appeal to 
Brahmanical learning or to a royal order to establish the validity of laws is consonant with 
Dharmaśāstra principles.
The processes reflected (and often recorded) in these inscriptions are explicitly intended 
to ensure the recognition and enduring validity of fixed legal rules. Even though there is no 
explicit reference to a “rule of recognition” for the laws invoked in such records, most of 
which are not recorded in any surviving charter or code, that does not mean that customary 
norms necessarily lack “lawness” in the Hartian sense. In fact, Hart himself suggests that in 
some legal systems custom may constitute law even before it is made the coercive order of a 
sovereign or is applied in a court, 71 and Frederick Schauer cautions that the rule of recogni-
tion need not be “a rule in any sensible understanding of that term. Rather, the ultimate rule 
of recognition is best understood as a collection of practices (in the Wittgensteinian sense), 
practices that may not be best understood in rule-like ways.” 72 While some of the inscrip-
tions discussed above may be viewed as examples of customary laws being recast (in classic 
Austinian mode) as the decree of a sovereign, for which an explicit rule of recognition could 
be found (along with the coercive threat of sanction that Austin considered a sine qua non of 
law), most of our examples are the product of “a collection of practices” for which a standard 
of recognition is deducible even if nowhere explicitly articulated. Dharmaśāstra provides 
one model of a non-state normative model that seems to offer a rule of recognition for such 
customary laws, but the inscriptions never draw on that textual resource.
the javanese transformation of indic law:  
the increasing salience of codes
Simultaneously with the development of these legal practices in India, from around the 
sixth or seventh century, as local elites in coastal areas of present-day Vietnam, Sumatra, 
Borneo, and Java began to emulate the culture and practices of high classical India, they 
imported Indic legal concepts and institutions along with prestige goods and other cultural 
trappings. 73 This emulation—likely motivated by a combination of material and intellectual 
aspirations—gave rise to royal states that presented themselves according to Indic models 
and sought to participate in the reciprocal relations with kingdoms in India, with diplomacy 
(then as now) facilitating both trade and cultural transmission.
From the point of view of local law, Java differs from India in that, besides legal inscrip-
tions, local-language legal codes emerged, codifying Javanese customary norms within a 
conceptual framework and textual format adapted from India’s Sanskrit Dharmaśāstra. 74 The 
inscriptions include many transactional records, but also (from the early tenth century) a 
smaller number of records of successful suits (jayapattra or jayasoṅ), which are extremely 
71. Hart 1994: 44–48. He asks, “Why, if statutes made in certain defined ways are law before they
are applied by the courts in particular cases, should not customs of certain defined kinds also be so?” (p. 46).
72. Schauer 2013: 532 n. 65.
73. See the summary by Pollock (2006: 122–34).
74. The primary sources for Javanese and Balinese law include more than two hundred Old Javanese legal 
inscriptions between 800 and 1500 ce; and Old and Middle Javanese codes (āgama) inspired by the Sanskrit 
Mānavadharmaśāstra, Bṛhaspatismṛti, and Kāmandakīya but reflecting mainly local norms. Texts of the latter sort 
survive today only in more recent manuscripts, in language showing some modern features, but references in the 
epigraphy suggest that they existed in some form earlier.
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rare (and late) in India. 75 Records of this type continued to be cited in litigation in Dutch 
colonial courts up to the eighteenth century. 76 In a recent study of the linguistic practices at 
work in these records, I have suggested that these inscriptions are composed in a specialized 
legal idiom characterized by the liberal use of Sanskrit legal terms of art inflected according 
to Javanese rules, and Javanese calques of Sanskrit phrases, resulting in a situation of “func-
tional diglossia” in relation to the non-legal forms of the language. 77
The linguistic phenomenon reflects the transformative role of Indic legal models on indig-
enous customary norms. The most obvious markers of the Indian conceptual structure are 
the Sanskrit technical expressions sprinkled throughout the Javanese. Thus, the adjudication 
of a dispute is described as a pariccheda (‘decision’) in a guṇadoṣa (‘a matter of right and 
wrong’), a clear echo of Manu’s expressions, guṇadoṣaparīkṣaṇam (‘investigating what is 
right and wrong’, MDh 1.117d) and guṇadoṣavicakṣaṇam (‘distinguishing between right 
and wrong’, MDh 9.169b). 78 Sanskrit loan words designate formal features of Indic juristic 
process that may have had no parallel in Javanese custom, at least as formal categories: the 
attestation of witnesses (sākṣī), the official resolution of the case (śuddha-pariśuddha), and 
the written document recording the outcome (likhitapātra), which concludes with a legalis-
tic phrase in Javanese that has striking parallels in Indian inscriptions: “The purpose of this 
‘victory-document’ is so that the matter may never be spoken of again” (kunaṅ sugyan tatān 
paṅujara ya muvaḥ dlāhaniṅ dlāha ya donikeṅ jayapātra).
In spite of the many borrowings, the Javanese records exhibit some distinctive terminol-
ogy. Some of these are Indic borrowings that acquire a specialized usage. Whereas it is 
common in Indian inscriptions for the word dharma to denote a pious endowment and for 
the boundaries of a parcel of land to be described as the sīmā, in Javanese, sīma (sometimes 
dharma sīma) denotes a distinctive Javanese variant of the South Asian land grant. The term 
sīma is usually translated ‘freehold’, and Zoetmulder describes it as a property “freed from 
taxes and other obligations” by decree. 79 Barrett Jones has argued that is it more accurate 
to say that “the transaction did not interfere with ownership of the land but dealt with the 
diversion of some of the produce. . . . It seems rather to have been a diversion of taxes or 
dues from one beneficiary to another; the villagers paid the same amount, but to a different 
authority” (1984: 60). 80
A sīma establishment involved an order (usually ājñā) by the king whereby income from 
a certain property—one or more named villages, or rice-fields (savah), or uncultivated par-
cels (vatək) to be converted into rice-fields—was assigned to a specified beneficiary, usually 
a temple.
The terminology is a bit different—the word parihāra (‘exemption’ from the obligation to 
make payments to the king) is notably absent—but the similarity of the legal arrangements 
enacted in the inscriptions are telling. For example, the copper-plate inscription from East 
75. E.g., the Guntur copper-plate (Brandes 1889), 22 July 907 (according to Damais 1955: 195–97, who reads 
the year as śaka 829), and the Wuruḍu Kidul copper-plate of 20 June 922 (Stutterheim 1935). Sometimes unreliable 
English translations from the Dutch are available in Sarkar 1971–72.
76. Hazeu’s account (1905: esp. 1–18 and 132–35) of judicial practice in Chirebon in 1768, and Hoadley and 
Hooker’s (1986: 255) discussion thereof.
77. Lubin 2013.
78. On the term guṇadoṣa in Khmer inscriptions, see Griffiths and Soutif (2008–9: 55–56).
79. Zoetmulder 1982: 1770.
80. The question is complicated by the fact that, as Barrett Jones puts it, the inscriptions are silent on the “pri-
mary effects” of the creation of a sīma and specify only the special effects of a particular establishment, such as 
prohibitions on the entry of the maṅilala dṛvya hāji and various officials, the property’s severance from a vatək, and 
the diversion of fines and dues to another beneficiary (1984: 59–61).
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Java from 929 includes among the immunities protection from being entered by any of a 
roster of persons who otherwise have some share in the king’s revenues: 81
[1.8] . . . paknānikanaṅ lmaḥ an sinīma, śīmā paṅurumbigyana rakryān kabayān, parṇnahanya 
svatantrā, tan katamāna deniṅ patiḥ vahuta rāma, muaṅ saprakāra niṅ maṅilala dra[1.9]bya 
haji riṁ daṅū [. . .] ityevamādi tan tamā rikanaṅ śima pa[1.14]ṅurumbigyan lmaḥ varuk ryy 
ālasantan, kevala rakryān saṅ maśīma ataḥ pramāṇā i sadrabya hajinya kabaiḥ, samaṅkana 
ikanaṅ sukha duḥkha kadyaṅgāniṅ mayaṁ tan (pa)[1.15]vvaḥ [1.16] [. . .] rakryān saṅ maśīma 
parānani drabya hajinya kabaiḥ, kunaṅ ikanaṅ mañambul [. . .] [2.1] rakryān saṅ maśīma ataḥ 
pramāṇā i dṛbya hajinya kabaiḥ, samaṅkana ikanaṅ masambyavahāra hanaṅkāna hinīṅhīṅan 
kvaihanya anuṅ [2.2] tan knāna de saṅ maṅilala dṛbya haji, pataṁ tuhān iṅ sasambyavahāra 
iṅ saśīma, [. . .] ikanaṁ samaṅkana tan knāna de saṅ maṅi[2.6]lala dṛbya haji, saparānannya 
sadeśānya, ndān makmitana ya tuliy maṅke luīranya 82
[1.8] The purpose of making the land into a sīma was so that it would be a sīma for the kurumwi-
gi [a kind of artisan?] of the Rakryān Kabayān. Its status is to be autonomous, not to be entered 
(tan katamāna) by the Patih, ministers [and?] Vahuta, officers [and?] Rāma, headmen, and every 
kind of those who formerly were Beneficiaries of the Royal Share 83 [a list of whom follows].
[1.13] All of these (and the like) may not enter into the sīma for the kurumbigis [on] the varuk 
land at Ālasantan. Only this honorable one (rakryān saṅ) who has made the sīma alone is author-
ity (pramāṇa) over all royal shares of it.
[1.16] [In the case of any of a standard list of crimes, it is] the Rakryān who has founded the 
sīma [who] should be the recipient of all royal shares pertaining to those. And as for those who 
“paint black” [or work in various crafts and trades listed], [2.1] the Rakryān who has founded 
the sīma alone is the authority over all royal shares of those. . . . Likewise, of those there who 
engage in business (ma-sambyavahāra), the number is limited. The total of them who may not 
be touched by the Beneficiaries of the Royal Share is: [2.2] four elders (tuhān) in one trade in 
the whole sīma [etc., listing trades and professions, with specific limits on how many shall be 
exempt]. [2.5] Such as these are not to be touched by the Beneficiaries of the Royal Share, wher-
ever they may go, whatever their place of origin. However, they should keep a written document 
(tuliy, i.e., tulis) to this effect.
A long list of particular rights and immunities follows. The prohibition on the entry of vari-
ous persons, although expressed without any Indic loan-words, closely parallels one of the 
81. Several similar copper-plate records purporting to derive from this period have survived, but all the others 
are later copies (tinulad), which are not wholly faithful to their originals.
82. Text as provisionally re-edited by Arlo Griffiths, omitting indications of initial vowels, paten (virāma), and 
the distinction between different graphs for /ṅ/. The translation given here reflects suggestions made by Griffiths 
during the Intensive Course in Old Javanese held in Trawas, Mojokerto, East Java, Indonesia, 13–28 June 2014; 
any errors are my own.
83. The lists of people classified under the label maṅilala dṛvya haji—often translated as ‘collectors of royal 
dues’ (Zoetmulder 1976: 191), or ‘taxation officers’ (e.g., Boechari 1965: 64)—are quite diverse, and the signifi-
cance of the status has been a matter of debate. Van Naerssen’s discussion (1941: 12–13) is the most comprehensive, 
and he finds them (in Barrett Jones’s words, 1984: 137) to comprise “a group of people on whom the king had a 
claim, and who in turn could make some claim from others.” The elements of the term suggest that such persons had 
some right to a share of usufruct (kilala), whether in produce or services, of properties belonging to the king, and in 
the inscriptions it serves metonymically to denote the beneficiaries of such a right (as does, elsewhere, rājavidhi, the 
royal order conferring such rights; see Zoetmulder 1982: 867, 1487). Barrett Jones surmises: “The establishment of 
a sima reduced or extinguished their rights over that sima. The mangilala dṛwya haji clearly were not landowners, 
nor rice producers, nor producers of other crops. Their names seem to indicate that they were providers of goods 
and services, or had a claim on such providers; their income then must have come directly or indirectly from these 
goods and services” (1984: 137).
254 Journal of the American Oriental Society 135.2 (2015)
most common of the protections offered in Indian land-grants, which are “not to be entered 
by cāṭas or bhaṭas” (acāṭabhaṭapraveśya, or a variation thereof). 84 The content of such priv-
ileges, as well as of the forms of taxation and revenue collection from which such land-grants 
are exempt, vary widely by region and period, so it is not surprising that the corresponding 
details in the Javanese inscriptions have a distinctly local flavor. Yet it may still be argued 
that the concept of the land-grant conferring privileges and exemptions, as a socio-economic 
and legal institution and as a written document to be produced as evidence, is a borrowing 
from India.
Besides such parallels with epigraphic legal records from India, Javanese records 
from as early as the eighth century refer to “the essence” (pə̄h) of Manu’s teaching 
(Mānavaśāsanadharma, Mānava-Kāmandaka). 85 Parallels are even more striking in the 
famous Bendosari jayapattra (“Decree Jaya Song,” fourteenth c.), 86 which, like several 
other Majapahit-era inscriptions, refers to a composite tradition called Kuṭāra-Mānava. This 
inscription (like others from Java) refers to a legal functionary, the ‘magistrate’ (pragvivaka 
= Skt. prāḍvivāka), who is prominent in Dharmaśāstras but unknown in Indian inscriptions. 87
We also find the Dharmaśāstric principle of long-term possession (bhukti) presented as 
evidence of land rights: “People acknowledge me as owner of 33 lirih on the basis of posses-
sion. . . that is firm possession since the time of my ancestors” (kabhukti deniṅ amadṛvyakən 
lirih 33 . . . punika ta sthiti bhukti saṅkeṅ tuha-tuha; plate 5 recto 1), “because it has been 
in our possession from time immemorial” (makahetu anadi kābhuktyanipun; 5 verso 1). To 
decide the case:
[5v5] . . . pinametakən śastradṛṣṭa, deśadṛṣṭa, udāharaṇa, guru kaka, [6r1] makataṅgvan rasāgama 
ri saṅ hyaṅ kuṭāramānavādi, maṅanukāra pravṛttyacāra saṅ pāṇḍita vyavahāraviccheda [6r2] 
ka riṅ puhun malama
. . . the norms of the Śāstra, the norms of the country, casuistry, and ancient teachers were sought 
out, relying on the essence of tradition found in the holy Kuṭāra, Mānava, and other books, imi-
tating the character and conduct of the scholars who decided lawsuits of old.
These parameters are not merely stated using Sanskrit legalisms: they reproduce Dharmaśāstric 
rules. Thus, Mānavadharmaśāstra 8.2 prescribes that the king render judgments “taking the 
norms of the Śāstra and the norms of the country as his grounds” (deśadṛṣṭaiś ca śāstradṛṣṭaiś 
ca hetubhiḥ), and the Arthaśāstra’s inclusion of udāharaṇa (‘illustrative case’) as a factor in 
such deliberations (KAŚ 1.5.14, 2.10.9). 88 
comparative conclusions
Even these few examples suggest that Indic dharma literature (especially the code 
of Manu and the maxims of Kāmandaki), along with Indic epigraphical practice, were 
84. Kern (1917: 24 n. 1) also makes this connection. The first couple of pages of Appendix I in Sarkar 1966 give 
numerous references to Indian inscriptions with such a provision.
85. Caṅgal inscription of 732; Mantring A, of 18 January 1178, and Buwahan D and Cempaga A, both of 22 
July 1181; for the texts: van Stein Callenfels 1926: 36–39, 46–48, and Goris 1954: 31–40 (nos. 601, 623, and 631). 
On such allusions, see Creese 2009a: 244–45.
86. Text as in Brandes 1913: 207–10.
87. The term prāḍvivāka is used in Manu and in later verse Dharmaśāstras, but not in Indian inscriptions. Arlo 
Griffiths notes its occurrence in Indonesia as early as the Lintakan charter of 841 śaka (Sarkar, 1971–72, vol. 2, plate 
III recto line 13). It would seem that these Javanese inscriptions are thus even more closely shaped by śāstra than 
Indian inscriptions—something that may be true of Javanese legal inscriptions more broadly.
88. Creese (2009b: 532–33) discusses these criteria as they appear in Old Javanese codes.
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appealed to in Java (1) to provide institutional patterns and conceptual architecture for 
formal law, and (2) to validate local Javanese standards of justice as law in the Indic sense 
of dharma. The Javanese situation differed from the Indian one in that it was not simply 
a matter of recognizing local customary norms under the authority (direct or indirect) of 
Sanskrit Dharmaśāstra. Rather, in Java and Bali, a local replica of Dharmaśāstra itself was 
produced in a legal register of the local language. Designed to validate Javanese and Bali-
nese legal rules and procedures, it went so far as to insert local customary standards into 
the Śāstra itself. The result were codes aspiring to be Dharmaśāstras but reflecting much 
more directly the “common law.” Only a very few, late examples of regional Śāstras (e.g., 
the Laghudharmaprakāśikā from seventeenth-century Kerala) can be found in India, and 
then mainly in Sanskrit.
This complex phenomenon may look to modern eyes very different from the production of 
constitutions and codes of statutes. More obvious analogies can be found in European legal 
history of around the same period: the Codex Euricianus (or Code of Euric), compiled by a 
Roman jurist for Euric, the Gothic King of Toulouse, shortly before 480, which recognized 
the customary norms of the Goths, superficially Romanized; or the Lex Salica, which codi-
fied Frankish penal and procedural law under Clovis (early sixth c.). Even more parallel, in 
that it involved codification in a local language rather than a classical language, is the Kievan 
code, the Russkaja Pravda, written in East Slavic (Matejka 1977: 195; Feldbrugge 2009: 
33–58). 89 In each of these cases, rulers influenced by an imported classical law (Roman law 
in Toulouse; Byzantine law in Kiev) sought to endow their subjects’ customary norms with 
not just the garb but the institutional formality of codified law.
Part of what makes all of these cases look unfamiliar as law to modern eyes is that the 
spread of a classical legal framework within the horizons of a cosmopolitan culture (whether 
Roman, Byzantine, or Indic) was not centralized; it was not the work of a single nation-state. 
The standards of recognition were a model that was disseminated by a multi-centered elite, 
and put into code and practice piecemeal at regional and local levels. If there is a modern 
analogy, it may be international law, which is growing in importance and reach in an ever 
more globalized world. In fact, the development and spread of Indic law might well be seen 
as a precursor—an unwieldy but functional system coordinating the legal affairs of indi-
vidual states and corporations.
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